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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its enactment in 1983, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure1 has become a subject of controversy in
Fan. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The text of the Rule appears infra text accompanying
note 27. Rule 4 was extensively amended in 1983 by Congress. See Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983). See also
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more than sixty decisions2 and has been discussed in several arti-
cles.3 The Rule allows service of process to be effected by mail,
subject to certain requirements and limitations. Although the Rule
appears staightforward, it actually contains numerous hidden un-
certainties.4 As the Rule is increasingly employed,5 its vagaries are
surfacing with increasing frequency and with distressing conse-
quences. In short, the Rule is adding to the very delay and expense
which it was intended to cure.6
Courts which have been called upon to interpret and apply the
Rule have done little more than create a bewildering patchwork of
decisions.7 In the process, these courts have often gutted the Rule,
made it difficult to predict the outcome of future cases, and con-
fused the practicing bar."
The courts, however, really are not to blame, for they are at-
tempting to work with a poorly drafted Rule which, from the out-
set, could not have worked and in fact is not working. If order is to
be restored, it cannot come from the courts, the bar, or the aca-
demic community. The Rule as written is such a hopeless quagmire
that even minor statutory repairs, clever lawyering, and thoughtful
judicial decisions cannot prevent the mounting chaos. The only an-
Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Eff. Feb. 26, 1983) with
Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 94-97 (1983) [hereinafter Siegel,
Practice Commentary] (discussing problems presented by amended rule).
2 See infra notes 33-274 and accompanying text (discussing many of these cases). Be-
cause of the general confusion surrounding the Rule's availability and applicability, there
are probably many other instances of defective mail service which have gone unnoticed by
both counsel and the courts.
3 For a detailed review of the existing literature, see infra notes 275-371 and accompa-
nying text.
4 Many of the uncertainties created by the Rule are discussed in Section IV.
1 Because the Rule appears, at least on the surface, to offer an inexpensive and expedi-
tious manner by which to effect service, it has generated considerable interest among the
practicing bar. Since using other methods of service is more expensive (due to the rising
costs of employing process servers, purchasing newspaper space for service by publication,
and seeking court leave to make alternative service), as well as more time-consuming, it is
likely that the frequency with which the Rule is employed will increase.
e See Note, Service of Process by First-Class Mail Under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 993, 1019 (1984). The fact is especially troubling in light
of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that the Rules are designed
"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P.
1.
7 Compare, e.g., Boggs v. Darr, 103 F.R.D. 526, 528 (D. Kan. 1984) (service by mail
permissible outside forum state) with Reno Distrib., Inc. v. West Texas Oil Field Equip.,
Inc., 105 F.R.D. 511, 513 (D. Kan. 1985) (service by mail disallowed for out-of-state service).
' See infra text following note 375 for a summary of the current state of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) law.
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swer lies in replacing the Rule.
This Article will begin with a review of the events which led to
the passage of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The Article will then consider
the text of the Rule as finally promulgated, and the issues raised
by the language of the Rule. Next, the Article will discuss the cases
which have construed the Rule. From there, the Article will ex-
amine the writings of other commentators since the Rule went into
effect. Finally, the Article will justify the conclusion that the Rule
should be abolished in order to promote the ends of justice, serve
litigants, and ease the current court congestion which the Rule has
engendered.
II. THE ENACTMENT OF RULE 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
In 1983, following years of consideration by both the Supreme
Court and Congress, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which governs the service of process in civil suits, was signifi-
cantly amended." The amendment of this Rule was part of a pack-
age of changes made by Congress to various provisions of the
Federal Rules.' °
The impetus for changing Rule 4 in large part stemmed from a
need to relieve the burden of the federal Marshal Service, which
had been responsible for service of process under the previous ver-
sion of the Rule." In the opinion of many, the Marshal Service had
' Prior to 1983, Rule 4 had provided in part as follows:
(c) By WHOM SERVED. Service of process shall be made by a United States Mar-
shal, by his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that
purpose, except that a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45. Special
appointments to serve process shall be freely made. Service of process may also be
made by a person authorized to serve process in an action brought in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the state in which the district court is held or in which
service is made.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c) (1981) (repealed 1983). See also supra note 1 (current version of rule).
" The change was formally enacted through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983). Besides Rule 4, the Act
made significant changes in Rules 6, 7, 11, 16, 26, 52, and 53, and added Rules 72 through
76. See generally Hall, New Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69 A.B.A. J. 1640 (1983);
Long, The New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-The First Four
Months, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 36 (1984).
11 See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted in 93 F.R.D. 255, App. A, at 259-60 (1982). Appendix A states:
The proposed amendments to Rule 4 are occasioned by the reduction in appropri-
ations available to the Marshal's Service and pending legislation to relieve mar-
shals of the duty to serve the summons and complaint in private civil litigation.
Appropriations have already been reduced and it appears that the proposed legis-
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become overwhelmed as the number of case filings grew to unman-
ageable proportions."2
The first formal consideration given to amending Rule 4 was
contained in a preliminary draft report prepared by the Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee.13 The draft, which was submitted in
September, 1981 to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, urged the
authorization of service by registered or certified mail, return re-
ceipt requested, with delivery restricted to the addressee. 14 The
draft report further proposed that a defendant be adjudged in de-
lation will soon be enacted into law.
Id.
Rules governing federal marshals are found in Chapter 37 of Title 28 of the United
States Code. A United States Marshal is appointed in each federal judicial district by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of four years. 28 U.S.C. §
561(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Marshals are supervised by the attorney general. Id. §
569(c). They are authorized to appoint deputy marshals. Id. § 562. The marshal service
executes writs, process, and orders. Id. § 569(b). The marshal exercises the same powers as a
state sheriff. Id. § 570. They attend sessions of court and are considered officers of the
district court and court of appeals which sit in their districts. Id. § 569(a).
12 The legislative history of Rule 4 makes clear that the primary motivation of Congress
for amending the Rule in 1983 was its belief that the marshal service had become
overburdened by the task of having to serve process. See Statement by a Member of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H9848-56 (dally ed.
Dec. 15, 1982) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADzaIN.
NEws 4434, 4438 [hereinafter Statement by a Member]. It is interesting that in 1983, Con-
gress still believed that the marshal service was overburdened notwithstanding the fact that
in 1980 Congress had amended the Rule to allow courts to appoint persons other than the
marshal to effect service. See supra note 9. Obviously, Congress did not feel that its 1980
change had gone far enough, and therefore made further changes in 1983. Some commenta-
tors, however, believe that Congress overestimated the problem. See, e.g., Note, supra note
6, at 1020-21 n.151.
" See Judicial Conference of the United States, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules 4 and 45 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft], reprinted in 91 F.R.D. 139
(1982). The procedure by which amendments to the Federal Rules are made are set forth in
28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2072 (1982 & Supp. 1986). Proposed amendments are initially considered
by one of the four Advisory Committees (civil, criminal, appellate, and bankruptcy). Once a
proposal has been passed upon by the appropriate Advisory Committee, which may sched-
ule public hearings on the proposal, the proposal is fowarded to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Once the
Standing Committee has approved the proposal, it is sent to the full Judicial Conference.
The Judicial Conference then submits the proposal to the United States Supreme Court.
Finally, the Supreme Court sends the proposal to Congress. If Congress does nothing for 90
days, the proposal then becomes effective. For a further discussion, see generally Spaniol,
Making Federal Rules: The Inside Story, 69 .BA J. 1645 (1983) (discussing this proce-
dural process); Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 905, 938-64 (1976) (discussing changes in procedures used to enact a rule).
" See Preliminary Draft, supra note 13, reprinted in 91 F.R.D. at 146-47.
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fault if it failed to respond after signing the postal receipt card.15 If
the defendant refused to accept delivery, a plaintiff could obtain a
default judgment after notifying the defendant by ordinary mail
that failure to respond to the mailing could lead to the entry of a
default judgment.1"
In April, 1982, the Supreme Court adopted the suggestions
contained in the preliminary report 17 and announced on April 28,
1982 that Rule 4 would be amended effective August 1, 1982 unless
Congress acted in a contrary fashion prior to that date. I" In quick
response to the Supreme Court's announcement, however, dissen-
sion was voiced by many practitioners and law professors.19 Some
opponents took the amendments to task on the grounds that ser-
vice by certified or registered mail was not an effective method for
ensuring that actual notice would be given to the defendant. In
particular, these opponents noted that even if the postal receipt
card was returned, the signature on the card often would be illegi-
ble and at times might not match the defendant's name.20 Others
expressed concern that the amendment would cause an explosion
in litigation over the granting and subsequent vacating of default
judgments.21 Finally, many critics argued that the speed with
which the Supreme Court had acted failed to provide sufficient
time for public review and comment.22
Due to the vehement protest surrounding the proposed
amendments, Congress felt compelled to delay final action and
postponed the effective date of the amendments from August 1,
1982 to October 1, 1983.23 In the interim, Congress invited further
Id.
10 Id. at 147.
17 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, supra note 11, reprinted in 93 F.R.D. at 255-58.
,1 Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. May
4, 1982). The Supreme Court was acting pursuant to the Rule's Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (1982). However, "[s]uch rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to
Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session." Id. The pro-
posed rules with Advisory Committee notes are reprinted at 97 F.R.D. 165-244 (1983).
19 See, e.g., Comment, Civil Procedure-Service of Summons and Complaint Under
State Law Subsequent to Attempted Service Under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), 14 MEM. ST. UL.
REV. 565, 568 (1984) [hereinafter Comment].
'0 Statement by Member, supra note 12, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 4435.
21 Id. at 4437.
22 See Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 91-92.
2S See Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246 (1982). The postponement did not take effect
until August 2, 1982. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court's amendments were in effect for one
[Vol. 61:1
19861 RULE 4(c) (2) (C) (ii) 7
comment and began its own study of the situation.24
Congress' review of the Supreme Court's amendments led to a
number of significant changes. Seemingly satisfied with the com-
prehensiveness of its own review, Congress deemed the amend-
ments complete several months before the October 1 extension;
these changes became effective on February 26, 1983.25 The system
upon which Congress finally settled was patterned to a large extent
on the one which had been adopted some years earlier by the State
of California.26
day-August 1, 1982.
21 See H.R. REP. No. 97-662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 96 F.R.D. 81, 131-
35 (1983).
26 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
Stat. 2527 (1983). Prior to formal amendment, consultations had been held between the
House Committee on the Judiciary and representatives of the Judicial Conference, the De-
partment of Justice, and others interested in the amendments. See Statement by Member,
supra note 12, at H9849, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4438. The
proposal was considered by the House and passed on December 15, 1982. 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H9848 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982). On December 18, 1982, the proposal
was considered, amended and passed by the Senate. Id. at S15578 (daly ed. Dec. 18, 1982).
The next session the House agreed to the Senate amendment and proposed one of its own.
Id. at H10476-77 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1982). After the Senate agreed to the House's amend-
ment, id. at S15913 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982), the Act was finally passed on January 12, 1983
and took effect on February 26, 1983.
Congress' version of the Rule reinstated state-authorized mailing procedures, see FED.
R Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i), and adopted a first-class mail method for service. Id. at 4(c)(2)-
(C)(ii). Congress disregarded the registered and certified mail procedures suggested by the
Supreme Court. See 128 CONG. REC. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4434, 4439-40.
2'6 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.30 (Deering 1972). Section 415.30 provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) A summons may be served by mail as provided in this section. A copy of
the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mall or airmail,
postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of the notice
and acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return envelope, post-
age prepaid, addressed to the sender.
(c) Service of a summons pursuant to this section is deemed complete on the
date a written acknowledgment of receipt of summons is executed, if such ac-
knowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender.
(d) If the person to whom a copy of the summons and of the complaint are
mailed pursuant to this section fails to complete and return the acknowledgment
form set forth in subdivision (b) within 20 days from the date of such mailing, the
party to whom the summons was mailed shall be liable for reasonable expenses
thereafter incurred in serving or attempting to serve the party by another method
permitted by this chapter, and, except for good cause shown, the court in which
the action is pending, upon motion, with or without notice, shall award the party
such expenses whether or not he is otherwise entitled to recover his costs in the
action.
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III. THE TEXT OF RULE 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
The most important change wrought by Congress was a switch
from the earlier-proposed system of certified or registered mail, re-
turn receipt requested, to a system in which the summons and
complaint are mailed via first class mail. The summons and com-
plaint are to be accompanied by two copies of a notice and ac-
knowledgement form, and a prepaid return envelope. If the de-
fendant does not respond to the summons and complaint by
signing and returning the acknowledgment form within 20 days,
the serving party must then effect personal service.
As finally enacted, the text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) provides:
(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant
of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d)
of this rule...
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by
first class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, to-
gether with two copies of a notice and acknowledgment con-
forming substantially to form 18-A and a return envelope, postage
prepaid, addressed to sender. If no acknowledgment of service
under this subdivision of this rule is received by the sender within
20 days after the date of mailing, service of such summons and
complaint shall be made under subparagraph (A) or (B) of this
paragraph in the manner prescribed by subdivision (d)(1) or
(d)(3).2
The heart of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is the notice and acknowledg-
ment form which the plaintiff must include with the summons and
complaint and which the defendant is supposed to sign and return.
The language of the form is set forth in Form 18-A in the Appen-
dix of Forms, which follows the Federal Rules. The acknowledg-
ment states, "I declare, under penalty of perjury, that I received a
copy of the summons and complaint in the above-captioned matter
Id. For discussions of California's service by mail procedures, see Slomanson, Dismissal for
Failure to Serve and Return Summons in State and Federal Courts in California, 19 CAL.
W.L. REV. 1 (1982); Kramer, Service of Process by Mail-A Proposed Revision, 48 CAL. ST.
B.J. 249 (1973); Comment, "Citado A Comparecer". Language Barriers and Due Proc-
ess-Is Mailed Notice in English Constitutionally Sufficient?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (1973);
Comment, California Legislative Changes in Service of Process, 10 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 192
(1969-70); Note, Service by Mail Provisions of California's New Jurisdiction Statute, 21
HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (1970).
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
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at (insert address)."2 "
Under the system established by Congress, if the defendant
fails to sign and return the form, personal service must then be
made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3). s9 They state,
respectively:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent
person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by ap-
pointment or by law to receive service of process.
(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership
or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under
a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any
other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive ser-
vice of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to
receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy
to the defendant.30
IV. CASES WHICH HAvE CONSIDERED RuLE 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
Despite nearly two years of consideration by numerous judicial
and congressional committees and comments from the practicing
and academic communities, the language of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is at
best difficult to understand, and at worst, hopelessly confusing. As
a result, numerous issues have emerged.
The first group of issues focus on the circumstances in which
service by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is available to a plaintiff. Is the Rule
applicable to all defendants or are there cases in which the Rule
cannot be used, such as seamen, infants and incompetents or other
traditionally favored defendants? Second, does the Rule apply re-
gardless of the basis for federal jurisdiction, or are there different
standards depending upon whether the basis for federal jurisdic-
tion is diversity as opposed to a federal statute? Third, is the Rule
I8 FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18-A: Notice and Acknowledgment for Service by Mail. Forms
appearing in the Appendix of Forms, although intended to be exemplary only, are consid-
ered "sufficient under the rules." See FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
29 FED. R, Civ. P. 4(d)(1), (d)(3).
30 Id.
1986]
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self-contained, or should it be read in connection with the other
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and if so, which
provisions and to what extent?
Furthermore, assuming that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is available in
a given case, do the summons and complaint have to be sent to the
defendant's home and business, to the defendant's home or busi-
ness, or to either location in particular? Is the Rule's command
that the mailing be by first-class mail mandatory or merely sugges-
tive, so that other forms of delivery, such as overnight express or
by hand, are also acceptable? If such other forms of delivery are
acceptable, would their use provide a basis for a plaintiff to argue
that the defendant should be deemed to have received the sum-
mons and complaint if the defendant later fails to sign and return
the acknowledgment form?
Regarding the acknowledgment form, how much of a deviation
from the language contained in Form 18-A is permissible? Is an
actual signature required, or will a stamp suffice? Does the defend-
ant have to sign the form, or can its agent sign the form?
The form also states that it must be returned within twenty
days of receipt, yet the Rule states that if the defendant's acknowl-
edgment is not received within twenty days of mailing by the
plaintiff, the plaintiff must effect personal service under one of the
alternative provisions. What if the defendant acknowledges within
twenty days of its receipt, but, due to the unpredictability of the
postal system, the form does not reach the plaintiff within twenty
days of the initial mailing?
Some, but by no means all, of these issues have been
presented to the courts. In response, the courts have fallen over
themselves in an attempt to make some sense out of the Rule.
These cases can be discussed most usefully by grouping and
presenting them in the same order in which they have been en-
countered in practice.
A. The Retroactive Use of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
One of the first issues addressed by the courts was whether
actions initiated before February 26, 1983, the date on which Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) went into effect, could take advantage of the Rule.
This issue was complicated by the fact that the law which enacted
the Rule had been passed on January 12, 1983, but had delayed
[Vol. 61:1
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implementation for 45 days.31 According to the Rule's legislative
history, "[t]he delayed effective date means that service of process
issued before the effective date will be made in accordance with
current Rule 4. Accordingly, all process in the hands of the Mar-
shal's Service prior to the effective date will be served by the Mar-
shal's Service under the current Rule."3' 2
The first case to construe this legislative history was Prather
v. Raymond Construction Co., Inc., 3 a Title VII race discrimina-
tion case. Prather involved an unusual set of facts. The plaintiff
had filed his action on February 7, 1983, and process had been is-
sued on February 10, 1983. On February 25, 1983, the United
States Marshal served an individual named William H. Raymond
III with copies of the summons and complaint. In April 1983, how-
ever, the plaintiff was advised that the wrong defendant had been
served, and on May 6, 1983, the court granted the plaintiff's mo-
tion to amend the complaint to reflect the correct defendant. On
May 10, 1983, the plaintiff then attempted to effect service on the
correct defendant by mailing copies of the summons and complaint
pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The correct defendant received the
summons and complaint. It then moved to have the purported ser-
vice quashed on the grounds that service upon it had to be carried
out pursuant to the terms of the old Rule because the original pro-
cess was in the hands of the United States Marshal prior to Febru-
ary 26, 1983.
The court refused to quash the service and stated, "[tjo
stretch the legislative history to encompass the circumstances of
this case is contrary to the clear intent of Congress and the court
declines to accept defendant's argument on this issue. '34
Equally interesting facts were presented in United States v.
Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation District5 which involved a dispute
over water rights in New Mexico. The complaint was filed on De-
cember 22, 1982, but service upon one of the nearly 1,400 defend-
ants was not made until March 19, 1983. The court found that:
The date that the summons was issued, not the date it was
actually served, controls in determining whether the old or new
version of Rule 4 applies .... The summons in this case was
31 See supra note 25.
'2 Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 122-23.
33 570 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
11 Id. at 281.
35 100 F.R.D. 687 (D.N.M. 1984).
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issued on December 22, 1982, and was placed in the hands of the
Marshals Service the next day, December 23, 1982. In view of the
above, this summons should have been served according to Rule 4
prior to amendment by P.L. 97-462. Rule 4 prior to the amend-
ment ... did not contain a general allowance for service by mail.
Therefore, service of process by mail on the defendant was not
sufficient.3 6
The reasoning and result reached in Bluewater was agreed
with in Ackermann v. Levine.3 7 In that case, a group of German
plaintiffs attempted to argue that service on an American defend-
ant in New York had been achieved by mailing pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The court found that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) had "no ef-
fect" because the summons and complaint had been filed and
served at various times in 1980.8
B. The Reach of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
1. Service in States Other Than the Forum State
No issue concerning the use of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) has been
more hotly debated, or received more judicial attention, than the
issue of whether the Rule can be used to serve a defendant who is
outside the state in which the action has been commenced. This
issue arises from paragraph (f) of Rule 4 which is entitled, "Terri-
torial Limits of Effective Service."39 That paragraph states in part:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held,
and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these
rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state .... .0 Rule 4(f),
however, is tempered by Rule 4(e), which is entitled, "Summons:
Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State." 1
Rule 4(e) states:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court
thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of
an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or
38 Id. at 689. The court relied on the legislative history to the amendments for its deci-
sion. Id.
3, 610 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.
1986).
38 Id. at 644 (citing Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation Dist., 100 F.R.D. 687).
39 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
40 Id.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
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found within the state in which the district court is held, service
may be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed by the statute, or order, or, if there is no provision therein
prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule.
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the dis-
trict court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a
notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an
inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or
notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by
reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his
property located within the state, service may in either case be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in
the statute or rule.42
Taken together, Rules 4(e) and 4(f) indicate that service of
process cannot be made outside of the state in which the district
court sits unless such service is authorized by a federal or state
statute 3 or the plaintiff convinces the district court to issue an or-
der authorizing out-of-state service.44 The resulting issue is
whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is subject to the territorial restrictions
of Rule 4(f), and therefore can only be used to serve a defendant
present within the state, or whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is a "stat-
ute of the United States" and can be used to serve process regard-
less of where the defendant is located.
The first case to confront the issue was William B. May Co.,
Inc. v. Hyatt.4 5 The plaintiff in May instituted an action in the
Southern District of New York against defendants who were resi-
dents of California. After being served with process by certified
mail at their home in San Francisco, the defendants signed and
returned the notice of acknowledgment which the court found
"substantially duplicate[d]" Form 18-A.46 The defendants later
moved to have the service quashed on the grounds that service
pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was unavailable when the defend-
42 Id.
41 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). In certain limited circumstances, the party to be served
can be served up to 100 miles outside the state in which the federal court hearing the action
sits. Id. The "bulge" rule authorized by Rule 4(f) applies to service made in connection with
Rules 14 (third party practice) and 19 (joinder of persons needed for just adjudication). See
2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDER"L PRACTICE § 4.42 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter J.
MOORE].
"4 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2631 (1982) (interpleader); 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1982) (lien
enforcement).
42 98 F.R.D. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
46 Id. at 570-71.
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ants lived outside the state in which the district court sat.
The plaintiff contended that the service was valid under Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). It argued in the alternative that even if the service
was initially invalid, the defendants had waived their right to ob-
ject when they signed and returned the acknowledgment form. The
court, in a short and fairly cryptic opinion, ruled that the service
was invalid. The court stated that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was subject
to the territorial restrictions of Rule 4(f), relying on a statement
made during one of the hearings held after Congress stayed the
implementation of the Rule adopted by the Supreme Court.47 In
deciding whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could be deemed to have au-
thorized out-of-state service pursuant to Rule 4(e), the court ruled
that it could not, because New York State service rules did not
recognize service by mail.48
Turning to plaintiff's waiver argument, the court found that
the language suggested by Form 18-A, and used in the form sent to
the defendants by the plaintiff, was worded so strongly and was of
such a compelling nature that a party receiving the form would feel
obligated to sign and return the form regardless of whether it knew
that there might be a basis for objecting to the method of service.49
As such, the court reasoned that to view the defendants' signing
and returning of the form as constituting a waiver of their right to
object to the service would be "inappropriate." 50
Four days after the decision in May, the same issue was con-
sidered by another district court in San Miguel & Compahia, Inc.
v. International Harvester Export Co.5 1 The plaintiff, located in
Puerto Rico, attempted to achieve service upon the defendant who
was outside Puerto Rico by using Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). After the
plaintiff made service, the defendant moved to quash the service
on the ground that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could not be used to serve a
defendant outside the state in which the district court sat unless a
state rule authorized service by mail. Puerto Rican law did not au-
thorize service by mail for non-resident foreign corporations; in-
stead, it required that such defendants be served by publication.2
The district court agreed with the defendant and noted that
47 Id. at 570.
48 Id.
19 Id. at 571.
I0 d.
98 F.R.D. 572 (D.P.R. 1983).
'2 Id. at 573.
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Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could not be read as having created a nation-
wide system of service of process by mail.53 The court explained
that if Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was meant to provide nationwide mail
service, it was incumbent upon the Congress to state so explicitly.5 4
Two weeks after the May and San Miguel decisions were is-
sued, another federal court, this time sitting in Chicago, held that
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could be used for extraterritorial service. In
Chronister v. Sam Tanksley Trucking, Inc.,55 the plaintiff, an Illi-
nois resident, sued a Missouri defendant and attempted to make
service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendant moved for
dismissal on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and insuf-
ficient process. The court, either unaware of or unpersuaded by
May and San Miguel, held that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) did create na-
tionwide service by mail. The court wrote:
While Rule 4 previously allowed service by mail only when that
method was specifically authorized by state statute, this is no
longer true. Effective February 26, 1983, a new subdivision,
(c)(2)(C)(ii), was added by Congress to the Rule, authorizing ser-
vice of process by mail in federal courts. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1137 (Supp. 1983). The federal
courts are thus no longer dependent on the forum state's rules
regarding this matter.5 6
However, several months later, the court reversed this position and
held, in a short opinion, that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) did not permit ex-
traterritorial service. 57
The next case to confront the issue was Jaffe v. Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago. Jaffe arose in the same district as
Chronister and involved a claim of improper termination of em-
ployment. The plaintiff used Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) to attempt service
on the defendants. The defendants received the mailed notice at
their places of business and duly completed and returned the no-
tices of acknowledgment. Thereafter, they sought to have the ser-
vice quashed on the ground that service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii),
by itself, was not sufficient.
The defendants argued that in addition to service at their of-
03 Id.
5 Id.
11 569 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill.), reu'd, 109 F.R.D. 1, 1 (N.D. IMI. 1983).
,6 Id. at 469 (footnote omitted).
1" See Chronister v. Sam Tanksley Trucking, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 1, 1 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
"8 100 F.R.D. 443 (N.D. Ml. 1983).
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fices, the plaintiff was obligated to make service at their homes.
The defendants based their argument on Rule 4(d)(1), which states
that service can be made "by leaving copies [of the summons and
complaint] at [the defendant's] dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then resid-
ing therein. '"59 The court summarily rejected the defendants' posi-
tion. The court explained that while it was true that a plaintiff
who chose to make service under Rule 4(d)(1) could make service
at the defendant's dwelling place by leaving a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint with a person of suitable age and discretion, a
plaintiff proceeding pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was not re-
quired also to make service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1).6 0
In its opinion the court did not cite or discuss Chronister but
did briefly discuss May and San Miguel. It wrote in part: "[b]oth
those cases ... enforced the territorial restrictions on service ap-
pearing in Rules 4(e) and 4(f)."' 1 Moreover, "William B. May and
San Miguel had no occasion to address the already-discussed fatal
flaws in the [defendants'] arguments," and the court's opinion
"does not undercut the rationale of those cases. "62
Swidereski v. Sperry Corp.'s was a diversity case which in-
volved wrongful death claims in connection with the crash of a he-
licopter built by the defendants. The plaintiffs effected service
pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendants responded by mak-
ing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the suit was time-
barred under the New York State statute of limitations.6 4 The
court ruled that although the claim was not time-barred, service
was improper because the scope of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is limited by
Rule 4(f) and New York State law does not authorize service by
mail. The court stated:
Service of process on Raytheon was defective, however, because
the summons was mailed to Raytheon's offices in Lexington, Mas-
sachusetts. Rule 4 authorizes service by mail, but only within the
territorial limits of the state in which the District Court is held.
F.R. Civ. P. 4(f), see William B. May Co. v. Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569
59 Id. at 444; see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1).
60 Jaffe, 100 F.R.D. at 444.
6' Id. at 445.
62 Id. at 445 n.6.
Is No. 83 Civ. 6842, 6843 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file).
6 See id.; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5.4-1 (McKinney 1985). This section
requires that wrongful death suits be brought within two .years of the decedent's demise. Id.
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(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Owen, J.). Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) would permit out-
of-state mail service in which the Court sits but, as noted above,
New York does not countenance thus mail service on corpor-
ations.
Although service on Raytheon was faulty, the Court finds
that Raytheon has waived its objections to improper service of
process. Raytheon's motion to dismiss was made only on the
ground that the statute of limitations had expired. F.R. Civ. P.
12(h)(1) clearly states that an objection to the sufficiency of ser-
vice of process is waived if not included in any Rule 12 motion to
dismiss actually presented to the Court.65
The issue next appeared in Boggs v. Darr,66 a legal malpractice
suit. Federal jurisdiction was founded on diversity, the defendant
was a Colorado resident and the plaintiff was a Kansas resident.
The plaintiff sought to make service by using Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
At trial, it was agreed that Kansas law did not permit service by
mail. The court noted that although the Rule had been in effect for
only a little over a year, other federal courts had already split on
the issue. In particular, the court cited and discussed the decisions
in San Miguel and Chronister. The court then stated that it had
decided to read Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) as authorizing nationwide mail
service. 17
The court explained that the question of whether a defendant
was amenable to service was to be distinguished from the question
of what method of service a plaintiff could employ to serve the
defendant. As to the former, the court ruled that the state long-
arm statute would have to be applied in diversity cases because of
Rule 4(e). As to the latter, however, the court held that federal law
applied, and thus service by mail was authorized under Rule
4(c) (2)(C) (ii).68
Epstein v. Wilder,69 decided a few months after Boggs, dis-
cussed at length the issue of whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) authorized
extraterritorial service by mail. A diversity case, Epstein, involved
a breach of contract claim between plaintiffs residing in Illinois
and defendants residing in Tennessee. After acknowledging receipt
of the summons and complaint, the defendants moved to quash
65 Swidereski, No. 83 Civ. 6842, 6843 (RCL) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Dist File).
06 103 F.R.D. 526 (D. Kan. 1984).
o Id. at 527.
i' !d.
6 596 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. IlM. 1984).
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service on the grounds that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could not be used to
make out-of-state service because such service was not permitted
by Illinois state law.
The court, relying on May, San Miguel, and Chronister,
stated:
[A]s 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) did not attempt to supercede 4(e), 4(e) controls
and mail service not authorized by the forum state rules cannot
be used for extraterritorial service [citing May and San Miguel].
Furthermore, a court in this circuit has found Illinois would not
allow service pursuant to 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) on out of state defendants
[citing Chronister]. Rule 4(f) does not independently authorize
mail service on extraterritorial defendants .... Service was
therefore improper ... [and] service of the summons and com-
plaint is therefore quashed.0
The court's reliance on Chronister was erroneous, since, as will be
recalled, Chronister had held that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could be used
to make extraterritorial service by mail even if the applicable state
rules did not authorize such service. 1
In Daley v. Alia,72 a New York resident who had suffered inju-
ries instituted a tort suit and attempted to make service on a Cali-
fornia defendant by using Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendant
moved to have the service quashed. The court agreed with the de-
fendant that the service was improper, citing without discussion
May.73
The most thorough review of the issue of whether Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) provides authority for nationwide service by mail is
contained in Reno Distributors, Inc. v. West Texas Oil Field
Equipment, Inc.74 Reno was a diversity case involving a Kansas
plaintiff who had attempted to serve two Texas defendants by
means of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). When the defendants refused to ac-
knowledge the service, the plaintiff made personal service on the
defendants and then moved for the costs of the personal service.75
70 Id. at 797.
71 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Of course, when the Chronister court re-
versed itself, the Epstein opinion became correct. It should be noted, however, that the
Epstein opinion cites only to the first Chronister opinion and makes no mention of the
second Chronister decision. See Epstein, 596 F. Supp. 793.
72 105 F.R.D. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
73 Id. at 89.
74 105 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan. 1985).
7' See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text; see also J. MoosE, supra note 43, §
4.408.
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The defendants contended that service by mail under Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was not available to the plaintiff because Kansas
state law did not authorize service by mail outside the state. As
such, the defendants contended that the plaintiff had been obli-
gated to make personal service and could not recover the costs of
such service.
The court agreed with the defendants. It noted that under
Rule 4(c)(2)(D), a plaintiff was entitled to recover the cost of per-
sonal service if the defendant refused to acknowledge service under
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The court explained, however, that in order to
recover costs, a plaintiff must demonstrate that service was author-
ized by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Thus, the issue before the court was
whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) authorized service in the present case.7 6
The court recognized that the issue before it had been before
other judges in the district beginning with Collier v. Equipment
Service Co.77 Because it was an unpublished opinion, Collier had
received little notice prior to Reno. In Collier, the court relied
heavily on May and San Miguel in holding that service by mail
pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was not available for parties who
were neither inhabitants of nor found within the state.7 8 The Reno
court decided, however, that "[iun light of contrary authority in the
district," it would take the "opportunity" to re-examine the hold-
ing that service by mail cannot be used on out-of-state
defendants. 9
The contrary authority which the court was referring to was
Chronister, Boggs, and an unpublished decision entitled, Smith v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc8 0 Bache was written by the
same judge who had written the Boggs opinion. Like Boggs, Bache
held that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) did authorize out-of-state service.
Thus, the Reno court was faced with having to decide whether to
follow Collier, which by this time was squarely in line with the
decisions reached by other federal courts, or whether to follow
Boggs and Bache which represented binding opinions.
In order to resolve the conflict, the Reno court turned to the
legislative history of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). It doing so it found that:
The intent of Congress in amending Rule 4 is clear .... There is
70 Reno, 105 F.R.D. at 512.
77No. 83-2122 (D. Ken. Dec. 16, 1983).
75 Id.
71 Reno, 105 F.R.D. at 513.
80 Civ. No. 84-4017 (D. Kan. Oct. 16, 1984).
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nothing to indicate an intent on the part of Congress to make
mail service under 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) available on an extraterritorial
basis. In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, we must
conclude that 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is subject to the territorial limits con-
tained in 4(f). Because service by mail under 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could
not be used to serve defendants in this case, plaintiff is not enti-
tled to costs for personal service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(D). s'
The day after the Reno court issued its opinion, another dis-
trict court came to the same conclusion in Thermo-Cell Southeast,
Inc. v. Technetic Industries, Inc.12 In that case, the court quashed
the Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) service because Georgia law did not author-
ize service by mail. The court came to this conclusion by relying on
May and the legislative history of the Rule.83
The next court that was called upon to consider the scope of
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was a court sitting in the same district as the
court which had decided May. In Union Carbide Corp. v. McKe-
own Transportation Corp.,s4 the plaintiff, a New York corporation,
attempted to effect service on an Illinois corporation by using Rule
4(c) (2)(C)(ii). As in May, the defendant argued that service outside
the state could not be made under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) because the
New York state service rules did not permit such service.s5 The
plaintiff argued that the law regarding the scope of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was unsettled, citing Chronister as support.
The court chose not to discuss Chronister, May or any of the
other cases which previously had passed on the issue. Instead, it
focused on the Second Circuit's opinion in Davis v. Muser.86 Da-
vis, which addressed the geographic limitations of Rule 4 when ser-
vice occurred outside the forum state, held that state law, rather
than federal law, was controlling."7 Davis, however, had involved
81 105 F.R.D. at 514 (citing Statement by Congressman Edwards of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 128 CONG. REC. H9848, (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4434, 4437).
82 605 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
83 Id. at 1124.
84 No. 84 Civ. 3716 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
85 Id. The defendant based its argument on section 313 of New York's Civil Practice
Law, which provides that service outside the state upon a natural person (or his executor)
who is either domiciled in the state or subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state is
made in the same manner as service made upon such a person within the state. See N.Y.
CIv. PRAc. LAW § 313 (McKinney 1985). Section 308 sets forth the various ways upon which
service can be made on a natural person and service by mail, itself, is not included. See id.
88 713 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1983).
87 Id. at 913-14. Although the Second Circuit reached this conclusion by looking to New
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Rule 4 (d)(1) rather than Rule 4 (c)(2)(C)(ii). Despite this fact, the
court in Union Carbide held that the case before it was governed
by Davis and could be changed only by the Second Circuit. The
court stated:
Professor Siegel in his Practice Commentaries on Rule 4,
opined that the 1983 amendments to Rule 4(e) granting federal
litigants the right to use state longarm statutes for extraterritorial
service, expressed a Congressional intention that the statutes gov-
ern amenability to service rather than method of service ....
Therefore Siegel believes Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is an appropriate
method of service for out of state defendants.
Although Professor Siegel's interpretation certainly has
merit, this Court is of the opinion that departure from the hold-
ing of this Circuit in Davis, if made at all, should be made by the
Circuit. Therefore, based on the present law of this Circuit, de-
fendant's motion to quash service made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is granted. Service on a foreign corporation under
4(e) must be made under the circumstances and in the manner
provided by state law.8s
The next case to raise the issue was Olympus Corp. v. Dealer
Sales & Service, Inc.89 Like the court in Union Carbide, the court
in Olympus felt constrained by Davis to hold that extraterritorial
service could not be made under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Unlike Union
Carbide, however, the court in Olympus also relied on May and on
the legislative history of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) to reach its
conclusion. 0
Fogleman v. Aramco91 involved an attempt by a plaintiff in
Louisiana to serve a defendant in Texas by means of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The court held that the Rule's provision could not
be used in the case sub judice:
York law, and, in particular, to sections 308 and 313 of New York's Civil Practice Law, the
court also found that the New York rules were nearly identical to Rule 4(d)(1) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, there was no conflict between the federal and state
systems. It is therefore something of an open question as to what the court would have done
had there been a conflict between the federal and state standards. See Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), where the Supreme Court held that when there is a conflict
between a state and federal rule in a diversity case, the state rule must be followed. Id. at
752-53.
" Union Carbide, No. 84 Civ. 3716 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Dist file).
69 107 F.R.D. 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
11 Id. at 304 n.2.
91 623 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1985).
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The rule was drafted to allow service by mail where personal ser-
vice could otherwise be made under Rule 4(d)(1) [on individuals]
or 4(d)(3) [on corporations]. As to corporations, such as
ARAMCO, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) only allows service by mail where
service could be made under 4(d)(3); that is, personally on the
corporation's officer or agent within the state. Rule 4(f) sets forth
the territorial limits of service under Rule 4(d) and thus also lim-
its Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) service to the territory of the state in which
the district court is found or within 100 miles of the place in
which the action is brought. Thus Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) can only be
used to serve a defendant who is amenable to personal service of
process within the state where the Court is located. [citing San
Miguel] .... There is no evidence that defendant, ARAMCO, has
an agent for service of process in Louisiana; therefore, Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) cannot be used to serve ARAMCO. 2
More recently, the issue was considered in Catalyst Energy
Development Corp. v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. 3 Like May and
Union Carbide, which were also decided in the Southern District
of New York, Catalyst held that under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), process
may be served pursuant only to state law. Since New York State
law did not authorize service by mail, the court found that service
"whether personally or by mail, [had to be made] within the terri-
torial limits of the state in which the district court is held. 9 4
The scope of the Rule continued to be an issue in Antrim v.
Jefferson-Pilot Corp. 5 In that case, a plaintiff in Pennsylvania at-
tempted to make service on a defendant in North Carolina by
utilizing Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendant's associate general
counsel signed and returned the acknowledgment form. Later,
however, the defendant moved to quash the service pursuant to
Rule 4(f). The court, relying on Olympus, Reno, and Daly, agreed
with the defendant that service outside the forum state was not
authorized by the Federal Rules. The court nevertheless found the
plaintiff's profferred service proper because service by mail was au-
thorized by Pennsylvania's long-arm statute.96
0' Id. at 910 (citing San Miguel & Compania Inc. v. International Harvestor Export Co.,
98 F.R.D. 572, 573 (D.P.R. 1983) and William B. May Co., Inc. v. Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
93 108 F.R.D. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
" Id. at 428.
" No. 85-0599 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
Id. (relying on Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
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Finally, in Kuehl v. Gasway Corp,97 one of the defendants
moved to have the suit against it dismissed on the grounds that its
predecessor had not been served properly and that service could
not now be made because the statute of limitations had run. 8
The plaintiffs had begun their suit on October 15, 1984, one
week prior to the running of the statute of limitations. On January
21, 1985, a copy of the summons and the complaint was received in
Michigan by Thomas A. Jeffers, a person thought by the plaintiffs
to have been the defendant's registered agent. Because Jeffers was
not the defendant's agent, he did not sign and return the acknowl-
edgment form.
The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Noting
that the plaintiffs had attempted to serve Jeffers pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the court explained that there was doubt whether
such service was available, since the suit was initiated in Wisconsin
but the summons and complaint had been mailed to Jeffers in
Michigan. In a footnote, the court cited the Reno case for the pro-
position that service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is not permitted
outside the forum state.9
The result in Kuehl is troubling. On the one hand, the issue of
extraterritorial service was not squarely Defore the court. On the
other hand, however, by suggesting that there was a question as to
whether extraterritorial service could be made pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the court was resurrecting an issue which had ap-
peared to have been put to rest finally in Reno. As a result of
Kuehl, however, the door to extra-territorial service may have been
re-opened.
2. Using Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) to Make International Service
The question of whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) can be used to
make service outside of the forum state has not stopped at the bor-
ders of the United States. Rather, in several cases, plaintiff's attor-
neys have attempted to use Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) to make service
abroad.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address the problem of
serving foreign parties in two different provisions of Rule 4. Rule
4(e), which as previously discussed, provides methods for serving
97 109 F.R.D. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
03 Id. at 659.
9 Id. at 661 n.2.
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parties who are not found in or are not residents of the forum
state, was at one time the provision which governed foreign ser-
vice.'00 In 1963, however, the Supreme Court approved a new para-
graph 4(i).101 Entitled, "Alternative Provisions for Service in a For-
eign Country," it provides five methods of service in addition to
the ones listed in 4(e). These methods are: (A) In such manner as
prescribed by the law of the country in which service is made; (B)
As directed by a foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory;
(C) By making personal service; (D) By any form of mail requiring
a signed receipt which has been sent by the clerk of the court in
which the action is proceeding; or (E) As directed by the court.10 2
Following the adoption of Rule 4(i), there occurred an impor-
tant change in the law of internal service of process. On February
10, 1969, the Hague Convention became effective and further com-
plicated extraterritorial service of process. Known officially as the
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,0 3 the Convention is
now adhered to by 24 countries.104
Article 10 of the Convention provides that service on a foreign
national may be made in a variety of ways, including by mail. 0 5
Many of the countries which have ratified the Convention, how-
100 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
'' Prior to the Supreme Court taking action, numerous commentators had called for
the drafting of a new-provision which would ameliorate the problems surrounding foreign
service. See, e.g., Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1031 (1961) (Rule 4's provision for foreign service in urgent need of reform).
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
103 20 U.S.T. 361; T.I.A.S. No. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S. 163. The Convention was done at the
Hague on November 15, 1965. Id.
' See id. Countries which are parties to the Convention include: Barbados, Belgium,
Botswana, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles, Sweden, Tur-
key, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany.
"0I Id. Article 10 of the Convention states:
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall
not interfere with-
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons
abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the
State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial
officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service
of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other com-
petent persons of the State of destination.
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ever, have objected to Article 10.106 Validity of the service is ques-
tioned when a plaintiff in a United States court seeks to make ser-
vice on a foreign national by having the clerk of the court mail the
summons and complaint to the defendant in accordance with Rule
4(i), and the defendant is a citizen or resident of a country which
has ratified the Hague Convention but has objected to Article 10.
In Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke,107 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that such service was
invalid. The court held that Rule 4(i) had been superseded by the
Convention since the Rule came into effect in 1963 and the Con-
vention had entered into force in 1969.10 s In doing so, of course,
court had done no more than apply the well-known statutory inter-
pretation principle of "last-in-time."109 Following this logic, Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) would supersede the Convention, since the Rule was
passed in 1983, fourteen years after the Convention came into
force.110
In Akzona Inc. v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,"' Du Pont
sought to bring a counterclaim against the plaintiff and its parent
company, both of which were located in Holland. Du Pont made
service in three different ways: by serving Akzona's registered
10 Id. Countries which have objected to all or part of Article 10 include: Botswana,
Czechoslavakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Seychelles,
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
107 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983).
100 See id. at 576.
109 See id. at 575-76. The court relied on the principle that the latter act of the sover-
eign controls if there is a conflict between two statutes or a statute and a treaty. See id.
(citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933) (subsequent treaty given effect
over a prior, inconsistent federal law) and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193-94
(1888) (later Congressional act upheld against earlier conflicting treaty)).
110 Two cases suggest that the answer is no. In Monroy v. Citibank, N.A., No. 84 Civ.
1040 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file), the court indi-
cated that whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could be used to make international service depended
upon whether the law of the state in which the court was sitting permitted extraterritorial
mail service. Thus, the court held that mail service was not available in the case before it
because New York state law does not permit mail service. See id. The court did not discuss
any 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) cases, and Monroy is not dispositive because the plaintiff effected personal
service on the defendant in Venezuela at approximately the same time that it mailed service
and the defendant admitted that personal service had been made. Similarly, in Harris v.
Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D. La. 1984), the
court held that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which permits plaintiffs to serve process pursuant to any
applicable state rule, did not supersede the Hague Convention. The court explained that
although Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) was enacted after the Hague Convention, the general nature of
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) had to yield to the specific regime set up by the Hague Convention. Har-
ris, 100 F.R.D. at 777-78.
m" No. 84-10 LON (D. Del. Oct. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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agent in Delaware, by effecting service on the Delaware Secretary
of State, and by mailing process under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The dis-
trict court chose not to address the question of whether Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could be used to make service abroad. Instead, the
court held that the adequacy of the service was governed by Dela-
ware state law, and therefore 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was inapplicable. 12
In CeCom Inc. v. Micro Tempus, Inc.,' 3 the plaintiff sought to
serve Micro Tempus, Inc. (MTI), a Canadian defendant, by mail-
ing a copy of the summons and the complaint by registered mail.
MTI received the mailing but did not respond to it. Instead, it
sought inter alia to have the case dismissed on the ground of in-
sufficient service. The district court denied the motion to dismiss
and held, sub silentio, that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could be used to
serve parties in a foreign country. The court explained that after
MTI failed to return the acknowledgment form, the plaintiff was
obligated to make personal service pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii)." 4 Thus, the court implicitly assumed that the Rule
could be used to make foreign service.
A similar result was reached in Ackermann v. Levine.1 5 In
that case, a group of German plaintiffs attempted to make service
in the United States on a New York defendant in order to acquire
personal jurisdiction in a suit brought in West Germany. When the
New Yorker refused to appear in the West German suit, the plain-
tiffs took a default judgment and then attempted to enforce that
judgment in New York. In determining whether the default judg-
ment could be enforced, the New York court focused on the Hague
Convention. The court also discussed Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), but held
that the Rule was not applicable because the summons and com-
plaint had been served prior to the effective date of the new rule.
As authority, the court cited several domestic cases." 6 Although
the court did not resolve the question of whether Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) could be used to make service abroad, the court's de-
cision apparently supports the use of the Rule in international
litigation.
112 Id.
'" No. 4-84-608 (D. Minn. Nov. 5, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
114 Id.
115 610 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 788
F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
,' Id. at 644.
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Finally, in Zisman v. Seiger,117 the court extensively discussed
the interplay between Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and the Hague Conven-
tion. In that case, the defendant sought to implead a party in Ja-
pan by effecting service on the party's wholly-owned subsidiary lo-
cated in Illinois. The Japanese party contended that service
pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was contrary to the Hague Conven-
tion. The court rejected this argument and concluded that the
Convention was not applicable to attempts at service made within
the United States. 1 8 Having decided that the Convention did not
apply, the court went on to analyze whether service had been prop-
erly made under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Since the defendant had made
personal service on the Japanese company by making service on a
long-time employee of the subsidiary, the court found that service
on the Japanese company complied with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). 19
C. The Need to Follow the Enclosure Requirements
As previously noted, a party that wishes to use Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is required to send the defendant a copy of the sum-
mons, a copy of the complaint, two copies of a notice and acknowl-
edgment form which substantially conforms to Form 18-A, and a
postage-paid return envelope. In some instances, however, plain-
tiff's counsel has neglected to include one or more of these items.
Such oversights have led some defendants to argue that, even if
service pursuant to the Rule is otherwise proper, the failure to en-
close the required item voids the service.
This argument was first addressed in Morse v. Elmira Country
Club.120 In Morse, the plaintiff's attorney had incorrectly tran-
scribed the contents of Form 18-A. The form was supposed to
state: "if you do complete and return this form, you... must an-
swer the complaint within 20 days." Due to a transcription error,
the form the defendant received said: "if you do not complete and
return this form, you ... must answer the complaint within 20
days." The defendant contended that the mistake made the form
incorrect and confusing. The Second Circuit disagreed:
We are very reluctant to nonsuit a plaintiff for so minor and obvi-
117 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. I1. 1985).
1I See id. at 199-200 (relying on Lamb v. Volkswagonwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104
F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D. Fla. 1985)).
119 106 F.R.D. at 200-01.
120 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
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ously incorrect a deviation. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) supports this con-
clusion, since it requires only substantial compliance with the
form, and not an absolutely perfect rendering. Moreover, plain-
tiff's error should have made defendant more alert than would
the version contained in the form; this is not a case in which a
deviation from the form lulled the recipient into inaction. This
single, minor, apparently unintentional deviation, which had no
significant impact on defendant's conduct, is not ground for void-
ing the mail service.121
Madden v. Cleland'22 was a section 1983 suit in which the
plaintiff alleged that he had been deprived of his right to vote.123
The plaintiff attempted to make service by mail on the defendants
by using Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). In the course of its decision, the court
noted that:
The attempt under that provision was defective from the start
since the plaintiff's attorney erroneously enclosed a "civil process
return," a form to be used for personal service by a process
server, instead of Form 18-A, the "Notice and Acknowledgement
of Service by Mail." The plaintiff's attorney signed the inapplica-
ble forms in the space for the process server's signature and dated
them July 3, 1984. The governor and the assistant secretary of
state signed and dated the lower portion of the civil process re-
turns as acknowledgment of their receipt of the summons and
complaint by mail.1
2 4
Because of the plaintiff's error, the court should have been
forced into deciding whether to quash the service or not. However,
the court found that it did not have to face the issue because:
In sum, the parties managed to press the wrong form into the
right function. At any rate, the use of the wrong form no longer
jeopardizes the effectiveness of service in the case sub judice,
since the defendants waived any defect in service by filing a mo-
tion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) without
raising the defenses of insufficiency of the form of process or the
service of process. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h) (1). 125
121 Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
122 105 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
12" Id. at 523.
124 Id.
125 Id. Rule 12(h)(1) provides, inter alia, that defenses of insufficiency of process or
insufficiency of service are waived if not raised at the appropriate time. See FED. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(1).
[Vol. 61:1
RULE 4 (c) (2) (C) (ii)
The next case to deal with the enclosure requirements of the
Rule was Griffin v. Argonne National Laboratory.2 6 Griffin was an
employment discrimination case brought under Title VII and the
Age Discrimination Act. Each time service was attempted by mail,
the plaintiff's attorney failed to enclose the acknowledgment forms
and return envelope as required by the Rule. The court, without
much explanation, held that this failure meant that all of the
plaintiff's efforts to effect service by mail were improper. 2 7
A slightly different set of facts emerged in Perkin Elmer
(Computer Systems Division) v. Trans Mediterranean Airways,
S.A.L.128 In Perkin Elmer, a case involving a claim for cargo dam-
age in connection with an air shipment of goods from the United
States to Saudi Arabia, the defendant did not return a signed
Form 18-A. Instead, it sent a copy of a letter which the court de-
scribed as follows:
On March 7, 1985, plaintiff's counsel received a copy of a let-
ter dated March 5, 1985 addressed to defendant's attorneys. The
letter was on defendant's letterhead and was signed "Betty Ro-
meo, Claims/NY." It stated in part: "Enclosed will [sic] find the
Summons that we at Trans Mediterranean Airways received on
March 04, 1985." The Jamaica, New York address given for de-
fendant was the same as that to which [the] plaintiff mailed pro-
cess. The copy was sent by defendant's claims clerk to plaintiff's
counsel in the postage prepaid envelope the latter had enclosed in
its mailing of process. Defendant, however, has never returned
the acknowledgment form that was provided by plaintiff .... 129
The defendant moved to have the service quashed on the
ground that the letter did not conform substantially with Form 18-
A, as required by the Rule. The court, however, found that the
letter was an adequate substitute for the Form because:
On its face, the Rule does not require that the "acknowledg-
ment of service" be the Form 18-A acknowledgment enclosed by
plaintiff with the summons and complaint .... Form 18-A itself
is intended to be illustrative only and need not be slavishly fol-
lowed. Although the forms provided in the Appendix of Forms of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "are sufficient under the
128 No. 83-C-7736 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
127 Id.
128 107 F.R.D. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
129 Id. at 57.
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rules," . . ., it is clear that they need not be used in haec
verba.130
The court in Perkin Elmer was wrong in its holding regarding
Form 18-A for two significant reasons. First, Form 18-A requires
the signer of the form to "declare, under penalty of perjury" that a
copy of the summons and complaint have been received. The letter
sent by the defendant's employee apparently contained no such
statement. The court did not discuss this omission, although it is
possible that the court did not feel the omission critical because
the letter was written in the normal course of business.
The second reason why the court's decision was wrong is that
the signer of a Form 18-A acknowledges receipt of both the sum-
mons and the complaint. The letter written by the defendant's em-
ployee, however, only acknowledged receipt of the summons.
Again, the court did not discuss this omission, possibly because it
chose to read the term "summons" in the letter to include both the
summons and complaint.
In Norlock v. City of Garland,113  a civil rights action, the
plaintiff attempted to make service in accordance with Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The plaintiff's attorney, however, failed to enclose
with the summons and complaint two copies of Form 18-A and a
stamped, self-addressed envelope. Instead, the plaintiff's attorney
enclosed a cover letter. The court held that:
The cover letter enclosed by Norlock's attorney makes no men-
tion of the need to return a sworn acknowledgment. Therefore, it
cannot be seriously contended that this letter "conform[ed] sub-
stantially to form 18-A." This is not an instance of a single error
in the acknowledgment form, "minor and obviously incorrect"
such as the addition of a single word on the form that might be
insubstantial and overlooked, nor the omission of only the return
envelope. No fault is attributable to the defendant as it might be
had he received the notice and acknowledgment form and refused
to return the acknowledgment.132
United States Automobile Association v. Cregor"3I was a de-
claratory judgment action. The plaintiff's attorney failed to send to
ISO Id. at 58. (citation omitted).
:31 768 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1985).
1" Id. at 656-57 (footnotes omitted).
1 617 F. Supp. 1053 (N.D. IM. 1985).
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the defendants the required return envelope. The court, .however,
found that this error was not grounds for vacating the service be-
cause the plaintiffs error was an oversight which did not greatly
prejudice the defendant. Since adequate notice was given, "this
technical failure created no basis for dismissal of the action.' 1 34
In Bruno v. Sweeney,135 a diversity case, the defendants al-
leged that the plaintiffs' attorney had served only one copy of
Form 18-A and had failed to include the prepaid return envelope.
The court ruled that the issue had become moot, however, because
the plaintiffs later undertook other service which the court found
proper.136
More recently, in Bernard v. Strang Air, Inc.,37 the plaintiffs
mailed to the defendant, by certified mail, return receipt re-
quested, a copy of the summons and the complaint. Apparently
planning to use the certified mail return receipt as an acknowledg-
ment, the plaintiffs did not include the self-addressed, prepaid re-
turn envelope and the notice and acknowledgment forms. The
court held that because the plaintiffs had apparently attempted to
substitute the certified mail return receipt for the acknowledgment
form, the service had to be quashed.' The court explained that
the Rule requires the plaintiff to send "the prescribed materials to
the defendant" and failure to comply results in ineffective service
of process. 39
Finally, in Watts v. Lyon 40 the plaintiff forgot to enclose the
prepaid return envelope and the acknowledgment notices. The
court explained that these omissions caused the plaintiff's at-
tempted service to be invalid. The court concluded that the plain-
tiff did not fulfill the requirements of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) by mail-
ing only a copy of the summons and complaint.14 '
D. The Need to Receive the Returned Acknowledgment Form
Assuming that the plaintiff who wishes to use Rule
Id. at 1055.
No. 85-4036 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
See id.
237 109 F.R.D. 336 (D. Neb. 1985).
138 See id. at 337-38.
239 Id.
10 No. 84-2593 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
141 Id. A further problem with plaintiff's service was that he was unable to prove that
the person process was mailed to was even the defendant's agent. See id.; infra notes 179-80
and accompanying text.
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4(c)(2)(C)(ii) to effect service gets past the problem of the Rule's
effective date, remembers to include all of fhe required enclosures,
and to be on the safe side, does not attempt to use the Rule to
make service outside of the forum state, the next set of potential
problems the plaintiff may encounter concerns the defendant's
failure or refusal to sign and return the acknowledgment form.
Intrinsic to service by mail under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is receipt
by the plaintiff of the defendant's signed acknowledgment form.
When the form is not returned, has the plaintiff effected service on
the defendant? In Morse v. Elmira Country Club,142 the Second
Circuit held that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) does not render void a "re-
ceived-but-unacknowledged mail service[;] service may be effective
without a return. 1 43 However, in Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. v.
Albano,"' the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's return of the
acknowledgment form was critical to effective service under the
Rule. The court concluded that because Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was an
integrated procedure for establishing in personam jurisdiction as
well as service of process, the defendant's return and acknowledg-
ment was essential. 145 Another court was more blunt. In Wise v.
Commissioner,146 the court unequivocally stated that "there is no
valid service where an acknowledgment form is never signed and
returned." 147
The conflicting positions taken by the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits are represented in a number of cases in which the plaintiff
has argued that the defendant's failure or refusal to sign and re-
turn the acknowledgment form was willful. In addition, several
plaintiffs have argued that the acknowledgment form was signed
and returned by someone who should be deemed the agent of the
defendant. These cases have led to divergent results, even though
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) itself is quite clear.14  The Rule states that if
the defendant fails to return the acknowledgment form, the plain-
tiff is required to make personal service. When personal service is
made, the plaintiff is then permitted to move for the cost of such
752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
'4' Id. at 39-40.
144 768 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1985).
' ' Id. at 730.
146 624 F. Supp. 1124 (D. Mont. 1986).
'4' Id. at 1127. The Wise court noted that there was no indication that plaintiff had
ever sent the acknowledgment forms to the defendant. See id.
148 See infra notes 149-172 and accompanying text.
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service.14
1. Defendants Who Willfully Refuse to Sign and Return the Form
The first case to raise and fully discuss the problem of defend-
ants who ignore service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was Billy v. Ash-
land Oil Inc.150 On January 19, 1984, the plaintiff mailed a copy of
the summons and complaint, along with the other required enclo-
sures, to the defendant. After receiving the mailing, the defend-
ant's in-house counsel wrote a letter to its outside counsel which
said in part: "It is our policy not to accept any service attempted
under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) F.R.C.P. As soon as personal service is
perfected on our registered agent, I will immediately notify you.
Until that has been accomplished, please do nothing in the
case."
151
When the defendant failed to sign and return the acknowledg-
ment form, the plaintiff sent another copy, this time by certified
mail, return receipt requested. An authorized agent of the com-
pany signed and returned the postal service card. Upon receiving
the postal service card, the plaintiff filed the card with the court,
and when the defendant's time to answer expired without the en-
try of a reply, the plaintiff sought and received a default
judgment."52
The defendant then moved to open the default judgment on
the ground that the second notice sent by the plaintiff was im-
proper because, having chosen to attempt service under Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the plaintiff thereafter was locked into making per-
sonal service.1 53 The court agreed with the defendant and vacated
the default judgment. The court stated, "[n]owhere do the Federal
Rules contemplate that a party may simply ignore pleadings it re-
ceives .... Actions of this character should certainly necessitate
additional amendments to the Federal Rules in order to curb such
abuses." 54
Less than a week after the decision in Billy, another district
court faced with the same problem came to a similar conclusion. In
40 See infra notes 237-284 and accompanying text.
180 102 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
151 Id. at 232.
152 Id.
1"I See id. The defendant also claimed that it was not "required to accept service
under" Rule 4(c)(2)(c)(ii). Id.
I Id. at 234.
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Stranahan Gear Co., Inc. v. NL Industries, Inc., 155 the plaintiff
received a default judgment after an attempt at service pursuant
to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was ignored by the defendant. The court
found that it had no choice but to vacate the default judgment.
However, the court noted the facility with which "a defendant can
frustrate the use of the inexpensive method of service provided in
the recent amendments to Rule 4 by refusing to return the ac-
knowledgment form."'15
In United States v. Jack Cozza, Inc., 57 a court utilized a very
traditional doctrine to circumvent the problem of a defendant who
had refused to return the acknowledgment form. The federal gov-
ernment attempted to effect service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
and later personally served the defendant. The defendant con-
tended that it never received the mailed documents, and that ser-
vice had not been effected within the 120-day time limit from date
of filing. The court ruled that there was a presumption that the
mailed service had been received by the defendant because, "[tihe
mailing of a notice pursuant to standard office procedure creates a
presumption that notice was received."' 58 The court found support
for this ruling by pointing to a footnote in the Second Circuit's
Morse decision: "In the absence of contrary indication we assume
delivery in due course.' 59
Reid v. Accutome, Inc.60 cited and followed Stranahan. In
that case, the court found that the "defendant implicitly admits
that it received a copy of the complaint and summons by mail,
[but] it denies that it returned an acknowledgment of service to
plaintiff as required by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)."'' Like the Stranahan
court, the Reid court found that receipt of a signed acknowledg-
ment form was a prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment. The
Reid court stated that "[s]ervice ... is not complete without the
155 102 F.R.D. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
156 Id. at 252. In a later proceeding in the case, the Third Circuit approved the district
court's finding regarding the awarding of costs rather than the granting of a default judg-
ment. See Stranahan Gear Co., Inc. v. NL Indus., Inc., 800 F.2d 53, 56-58 (3d Cir. 1986).
157 106 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
158 Id. at 267. But see Boykin v. Commerce Union Bank of Union City, 109 F.R.D. 344,
347 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (attorney's standard office procedure insufficient evidence to create
presumption that defendant actually received mailing).
15o Id. at 267 (quoting Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 36 n.2 (2d Cir.
1984)).
160 No. 85-3592 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
161 Id.
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return of the acknowledgment of service, and the plaintiff must re-
sort to another method of service if the defendant fails to return
the acknowledgment. Failure to return an acknowledgment. . . is
not grounds for the entry of a default judgment." '162
In Bernard v. Strang Air, Inc.,163 the plaintiff did not receive
back the acknowledgment form. The court held that this was fatal
to mail service and therefore required the plaintiff to effect per-
sonal service. The court stated that "receipt of the acknowledg-
ment.., is a necessity for effective service by mail," and that the
certified mail method used by the plaintiff was contrary to con-
gressional mandate."6
The harshest judicial rebuke of a defendant who ignored a
mailing under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) came in United States ex rel. Itri
Brick & Concrete Corp. v. Union Indemnity Insurance Co. of New
York. 165 In that case, one of the defendant insurance companies
ignored the plaintiff's mailing of service. The plaintiff then made
personal service upon the defendant. The defendant moved to
have the service quashed upon the grounds that the personal ser-
vice was defective.
Finding that the plaintiff's personal service was proper, the
court refused to quash the service. In discussing the defendant's
contention that the plaintiff had failed to follow the alternative
service provisions of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the court stated:
Once again a defendant has sought to delay and add to litigation
expense by taking advantage of the somewhat confusing language
of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
the two years following the 1983 amendments this practice has
already produced a long line of case law. [citations omitted]
Under the Federal Rules as originally promulgated by the Su-
preme Court, the question now posed would not have arisen. [ci-
tation omitted].
Because defendant's affirmative defense was not literally friv-
olous, no Rule 11 sanctions are imposed. The somewhat baroque
structure by which the Federal Rules partially incorporate state
law may have been the source of honest confusion. The court,
nevertheless, deplores what seems to have been a practice of ig-
noring service by mail in an attempt to defeat jurisdiction and
162 Id. Accord Kuehl v. Gasway Corp., 109 F.R.D. 657, 660-61 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
103 109 F.R.D. 336 (D. Neb. 1985).
,04 Id. at 338.
16 109 F.R.D. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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the congressional intent to reduce expense. Such an attitude is
especially dubious in the regulated insurance industry that serves
an important public need. The public ultimately pays the cost of
this unnecessary motion practice. 6
In the past, case law clearly indicated that a plaintiff who was
unsuccessful in making service by mail must additionally effect
personal service. Recent cases, however, have departed from this
rule. In Deshmukh v. Cook,'1 7 the plaintiffs attempted to serve the
defendants under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) by mailing process to the of-
fices of the defendants. The defendants received the mailing but
refused to acknowledge service. Since the plaintiffs did not at-
tempt to follow up with personal service, the defendants argued
that they had not been properly served. 8 The court disagreed.
Since the defendants did not deny that they had received the doc-
uments by mail and did not provide any explanation for failing to
return the acknowledgments, the court held that the plaintiffs had
made valid and effective service and concluded that "a recalcitrant
defendant should not be accorded a windfall" for refusing to re-
spond to the plaintiffs' attempts of service by mail.'
More recently, in Systems Industries, Inc. v. Han,170 another
district court came to the same conclusion. In Han, the plaintiff
attempted to serve the defendants by a mailing pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendants received the copies and signed a
postal receipt for it, but refused to return the acknowledgment
form to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then moved for a default judg-
ment and sent copies of its motion for entry of a default judgment
to the defendants. The defendants, however, refused to open these
envelopes.'
The plaintiff was granted the default judgment and a hearing
was scheduled to determine damages. This prompted the defend-
ants to become involved in the suit. They sought to have the de-
fault judgment vacated on the grounds that the plaintiff had never
made proper follow up personal service as required by the Rule.
The court disagreed, holding that where a defendant actually re-
... Id. at 156. The court did order the defendant to pay the cost of personal service. See
id.
::7 630 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
188 Id. at 958-59.
169 Id. at 959.
17' No. 84-5457 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
171 Id.
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ceives the mailed notice, follow up personal service is not required.
The court wrote:
There is no indication that Congress intended to provide defend-
ants who actually received the documents with a choice as to
whether they would prefer service by mail or in person.
Moreover, to construe the rule as defendants have done
would frustrate the very purpose of allowing service of process by
mail. To allow defendants to insist on personal service of process
would be to grant defendants yet another instrument of delay in
an already ample arsenal, and there is no evidence that Congress
intended such a result.17 2
The results reached in Cook and Han are interesting for two
reasons. First, they clearly contradict the language of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) which states that a failed mail service requires subse-
quent personal service. Second, the results were reached in two
districts which had already considered many Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
cases and had previously indicated a willingness to abide by the
text of the Rule. 73 Thus, whether Cook and Han are momentary
aberrations or whether they reflect the future is an open issue.
2. Defendants Whose "Agents" Sign and Return the Form
A number of cases have arisen in which the plaintiff has re-
ceived the returned acknowledgment form, but the form has been
signed by someone other than the defendant. The first case to ad-
dress this situation was Day v. Commissioner of Correction.17 4 In
Day, a prison inmate brought a section 1983 action against a num-
ber of prison officers and attempted service pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Two of the defendants did not return the acknowl-
edgment, while a third defendant's acknowledgment form was re-
turned for him by the Commissioner of the Corrections Depart-
ment. The court dismissed the complaint against the first two
defendants, finding that return of the acknowledgment form or
personal service was a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction over a
defendant. 17 5 As to the third defendant, the court dismissed the
complaint against him on the grounds that there was no evidence
172 Id.
171 See Reid v. Accutome, Inc., No. 85-3592 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (alternate service required); United States v. Jack Cozza, Inc., 106 F.R.D.
264, 266-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (personal service required).
174 83 Civ. 8062 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
175 Id.
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in the record that the Commissioner had been appointed by the
defendant as his agent for service of process and that it did not
appear that she was authorized by law to receive service of process
on his behalf." 6
An even more bizarre set of facts was present in Anderson v.
Stevas.17 In Anderson, the plaintiff attempted to effect service on,
among others, the assistant clerk of the United States Supreme
Court. When the plaintiff's papers reached the Supreme Court, the
Court's mailroom personnel, rather than the assistant clerk him-
self, stamped and returned the acknowledgment. The Anderson
court found that the mailroom's stamp was insufficient because
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) requires the defendant himself to sign the
acknowledgment. 78
The most recent case addressing this issue is Watts v. Lyon.1 79
In Watts, the plaintiff's process server attempted to serve the de-
fendant, a policeman, by sending a copy of the summons and com-
plaint by certified mail to the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP").
The FOP received and signed the postal receipt card. The plaintiff
argued that this constituted effective service on the defendant.
However, the court disagreed, explaining that the FOP had not
been shown to be defendant's agent. The court stated that there
was no showing that the person who signed the summons and com-
plaint was an agent authorized to receive service of process on the
defendant's behalf. The court refused to infer from these facts that
the individual was an agent authorized to receive service of process
on behalf of the defendant. 80
E. The Right to Shift Service Devices
1. Plaintiffs Who Initially Use Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and Are
Successful
In an interesting case, a plaintiff who had been successful at
serving the defendant under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was confronted
with the argument that he also had a duty to serve the defendant
by state service methods.
176 Id.
177 625 F. Supp. 1244 (D.D.C. 1985).
178 Id. at 1245-46 & n.3.
179 No. 84-2593 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
"0o Id. The court also discussed the plaintiff's failure to enclose the required acknowl-
edgment forms in the mailing. Id.; see supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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McDougald v. Jenson""1 involved a complicated child custody
battle in which the father attempted to serve the mother by means
of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). When that failed, he effected personal ser-
vice on her. On appeal, the mother conceded that service was made
as required by the Rule, but argued that this was insufficient be-
cause such service did not comply with the applicable Florida long-
arm statute. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, explaining that when
service is made pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), there is no require-
ment that such service "also satisfy the requirements of the state
long-arm statute."18 2
McDougald is a particularly interesting case because it was de-
cided four days after Academy Life Insurance Co. v. Roth.83 In
Academy, the plaintiff had successfully served the defendant pur-
suant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which permits a party in federal court
to make service pursuant to a state statute. The defendant argued
that service should also have been made under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
The court rejected this argument, explaining that, "Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i) and Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) are alternate means to make
service upon individuals. 18 4
2. Plaintiffs Who Use Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and Are Not Successful
May a plaintiff shift service devices when initial attempts to
serve under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) fail, or is the plaintiff constrained
to use the Rule after initially choosing to effect service under its
terms? Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) does require that personal service be
made if the defendant does not sign and return the acknowledg-
ment form within twenty days. However, some plaintiffs have ar-
gued that a failed attempt at mail service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
does not preclude other avenues of service, such as service by pub-
lication. Defendants, on the other hand, have argued that, having
chosen its path, the plaintiff's subsequent course is governed solely
by the Rule.
This question, of course, is opposite to the question posed
above in the McDougald case. The first case to discuss this issue
181 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1986).
182 Id. at 1468, 1487. The mother apparently relied on Federal Rule 4(e), which the
court held only permits and does not require out-of-state service pursuant to the state's long
arm statute. See id. at 1487; FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
'8 No. 84-4989 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
104 Id.
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was Packard Press Corp. v. Corn Vu Corp.185 In Packard, the
plaintiff moved for, and received, a default judgment after the de-
fendant failed to return the acknowledgment form. The defendant
then moved to vacate the default judgment. The plaintiff argued
that as mail service had not been made pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) rather than pursuant to the Pennsylvania long-arm
statute, the default judgment should not be vacated because no
follow up personal service was required. The court did not rule on
the plaintiff's contention. Instead, the court held that since the de-
fendant had not acted in a culpable fashion, vacating the default
was proper.186
In FDIC v. Sims, 187 the plaintiff attempted service by mail,
which remained unclaimed at the post office and was eventually
sent back to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's attorney then asked the
court to permit service by publication and subsequently filed an
affidavit with the court alleging that the failure of the defendant to
claim the mail was proof that the defendant was secreting herself
and avoiding service. The court noted that the affidavit filed by the
plaintiff's attorney did not state the contents of the envelope
which had been mailed to the defendant, and also did not state
whether the service was made in accordance with Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The court explained that:
[I]f a form 18-A was here sent by the FDIC, it thereafter locked
itself into the only subsequent mode of service, namely, actual
personal delivery of the summons and complaint on defendant, a
mode of service which admittedly has not been attempted, much
less accomplished, here. Therefore, if form 18-A was mailed, there
is no valid service in this case, and FDIC must follow the man-
date of Rule 4(d)(1).188
Because the court could not determine from the record
whether Form 18-A had been included, the court considered
whether the plaintiff had actually attempted service pursuant to
state procedures under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). The court found that
the plaintiff, even if he had not initially elected Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
and was therefore not bound by the mandate of that rule, had still
failed to comply with applicable state rules, and had not made ef-
185 584 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
'1 Id. at 75. The court did reject, however, the defendant's contention that the court
lacked in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 75-76.
100 F.R.D. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
18 Id. at 794.
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fective service.18 9
Subsequent to Sims came Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer
Building Systems.190 In Armco, the plaintiff attempted to effect
service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). When the defendant failed
to acknowledge the service, the plaintiff argued that he had made
good service under Maryland state law. The Fourth Circuit re-
jected the plaintiff's contention. Specifically, the court found:
The attempted service in this case was unequivocally made
pursuant to Federal Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). When no acknowledg-
ment was received within twenty days, that rule itself required
that service be made upon this corporate defendant under sub-
paragraph (A) or (B) in the manner prescribed by subdivision
(d)(3) [of Rule 4], which provide for personal service upon an
agent of the corporate defendant. Once service is attempted
under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), service of process in accordance with
state law, as otherwise authorized by 4(c)(2)(C)(i), is not
permissible.""1
Billy v. Ashland Oil, Inc."92 was the next case to consider the
issue. In Billy, the defendant refused to return the acknowledg-
ment form. The plaintiff then moved for and received a default
judgment, without first attempting to make personal service. Rely-
ing on Sims, the court vacated the default judgment, writing in
part that, "[w]hen [p]laintiff did not receive the Notice and Ac-
knowledgement forms after the first attempted service, having
elected to proceed under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), personal service was
mandatory."M9 3
A similar result was indicated in Henry v. Glaize Maryland
Orchards, Inc.19 4 There the court raised sua sponte the hypotheti-
cal issue of whether personal service would have to be carried out
by a plaintiff who received a signed acknowledgment from the de-
fendant more than twenty days after the date of mailing. In partic-
ular, the court asked whether personal service would be required if
the acknowledgment was returned on the twenty-first day after
mailing. The court concluded that in such a situation, personal ser-
vice would have to be carried out, even though such service would
189 See id. at 794-97.
190 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984).
"I Id. at 1089.
.92 102 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
193 Id. at 233.
19, 103 F.R.D. 589 (D. Md. 1984).
19861
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
be "superfluous." In addition, the court noted that requiring a
plaintiff to make personal service in such a case would "defeat one
of the primary purposes of the new mail service provision, that of
simplifying service of process and reducing its cost to would-be
litigants."1 95
In Griffin v. Argonne National Laboratory,19 6 the court, with-
out any extended discussion or analysis, noted that the plaintiff
was, "required under the rule to attempt service by other means
when the Laboratory failed to respond to mail service within 20
days."M97
In Norlock v. City of Garland,"9 8 the Fifth Circuit also briefly
discussed the issue. In Norlock, the plaintiff attempted mail ser-
vice under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), but failed to enclose the required
acknowledgment forms and return envelope and did not attempt
to follow up with personal service. The defendant challenged the
sufficiency of the service. Relying on Sims, the court stated: "[b]y
first essaying service by mail, he 'thereafter locked [him]self into
the only subsequent mode of service, namely, actual personal
delivery . . ." 199
Subsequently, in Shuster v. Conley,00 the court relied on Billy
in reaching the same conclusion. "[O]nce plaintiff has unsuccess-
fully attempted service by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), personal service is mandatory." 01 The court there-
fore refused plaintiff's request for permission to serve by publica-
tion pursuant to state law under Rule 4(c)(2) (C) (i).202
The requirement that a plaintiff effect personal service after
mail service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) has failed received a particu-
larly strong endorsement in In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litiga-
tion.203 In that case, the plaintiffs attempted to sue the partners of
a national accounting firm for alleged violations of federal securi-
l" Id. at 591.
"' No. 83 C 7736 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
197 Id. The court held that the plaintiff's service by mail was ineffective because he
failed to include the required acknowledgment form. See id.
-9- 768 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1985).
'9, Id. at 656-57 (quoting FDIC v. Sims, 100 F.R.D. 792, 794 (N.D. Ala. 1984)). Norlock
was later specifically overruled by the Fifth Circuit on this point. See Mumana, Inc. v.
Jacobson, 804 F.2d 1390, 1393 (5th Cir. 1986) (personal service not "automatically" required
by Rule after service by mail fails since other authorized methods may be employed).
200 107 F.R.D. 755 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
201 Id. at 757 (citing Billy v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 233 (W.D. Pa. 1984)).
202 Id. at 758.
2-3 110 F.R.D. 528 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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ties laws. The firm consisted of approximately 470 partners, and
the plaintiffs attempted to serve each partner by sending hundreds
of individual notices under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Only four acknowl-
edgments were returned. The plaintiffs then asked the court to is-
sue an order determining whether service by mail had been com-
pleted. The court refused and stated that although "[t]hese
plaintiffs have been frustrated by their inability to obtain personal
service and have incurred substantial expenses in their futile at-
tempts... absent the return and filing of the defendants' acknowl-
edgments, mail service is insufficient."204
F. Deadlines in Connection with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
One of the most vexing problems in using Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is
the need to observe the various deadlines which surround the Rule.
In particular, plaintiffs must be wary of the twenty-day deadline
imposed by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and the 120-day deadline imposed
by Rule 4(j). In addition, there is a deadline contained in Rule 4(g)
relating to the filing of proof-of-service, which does not state a spe-
cific deadline but which appears to imply an outside limit of 120
days.
1. The Twenty-Day Deadlines of 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and Form 18-A
As a result of poor drafting, the twenty-day deadline actually
refers to two different twenty-day periods. One twenty-day period
is mentioned in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) itself. The Rule states that if
the sender does not receive an acknowledgment of service "within
20 days after the date of mailing, service of such summons and
complaint shall be made [by personal service]." Form 18-A also
refers to a twenty-day period, but it is not the same twenty-day
period mentioned in the Rule. The notice part of the Form states,
"You must complete the acknowledgment part of this form and
return one copy of the completed form to the sender within twenty
days." Thus, while the Rule measures the twenty days from the
time the sender first mails the Form, the Form measures the
twenty days from the time the recipient first receives the Form.
The inconsistency between the Rule and the Form has caused
problems when a plaintiff, who has followed up an unsuccessful at-
tempt at service by mail with personal service, moves for the costs
204 Id. at 530, 532.
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of personal service under Rule 4(c)(2)(D). In Henry v. Glaize
Maryland Orchards, Inc.,205 the court stated:
Rule 4(c)(2)(D), strictly construed, would permit the costs of sub-
sequent personal service to be levied against a defendant who
fails to "complete and return [the form 18-A notice and acknowl-
edgment] within 20 days after mailing[.]" Yet form 18-A only re-
quires that it be completed and returned to the sender "within 20
days." No specific reference to the date of mailing as being the
first of the 20 days is... set out in full therein-indeed, the Rule
is not even specifically cited to the party being served. Thus,
some doubt exists as to the proper method to be employed when
computing time under Rule 4(c)(2)(D)20 6
A recent case that considered the twenty-day requirements
contained an unusual fact pattern. Unionmutual Stock Life Insur-
ance Co. of America v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co.20 7 concerned
alleged breaches of a reinsurance agreement. The contract called
for disputes to be resolved through arbitration to be held in Port-
land, Maine. In December 1984, the defendant attempted to re-
scind the agreement on the ground that the contract had become
frustrated. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition on January 14,
1985, seeking an order directing the parties to submit to arbitra-
tion the issue of frustration. The plaintiff gave notice of its peti-
tion by sending to the defendant by registered mail, return receipt
requested, a copy of the summons and petition together with ac-
knowledgment forms pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The postal
receipt indicated that the defendant received the mailing on Janu-
ary 18, 1985. On February 1, 1985, counsel for the defendant
signed and mailed back Form 18-A. 08
Also on February 1, 1985, a hearing was held before a magis-
trate who granted the plaintiff's petition and ordered the parties to
arbitration. The district court, making de novo determinations,
also ordered the parties to arbitration. The defendant then ap-
2 5 103 F.R.D. 589 (D. Md. 1984).
20I Id. at 590-91. For a case in which the court held that, in order for service to be
effective, the plaintiff must receive the signed acknowledgment within twenty days from the
time when the plaintiff mailed the summons and complaint, see Coldwell Banker & Co. v.
Eyde, No. 85 C 8036 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In contrast,
Rust v. City of Kansas, Kansas, 107 F.R.D. 371 (W.D. Mo. 1985), held that service under
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is effected on the date on which the acknowledgment is signed, so long as
that date is within twenty days of mailing of process.
107 774 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1985).
20I Id. at 525-26.
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pealed to the First Circuit. One of the issues which the First Cir-
cuit addressed was whether the defendant had received timely no-
tice of the hearing.209 Under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), it appeared that
the hearing had been held too soon. Under section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"),2 10 however, only five days notice is re-
quired. The plaintiff contended that whether notice was timely
should be determined under the FAA, while the defendant argued
that timeliness had to be determined under the Federal Rules be-
cause the plaintiff had opted to make service in accordance with
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The First Circuit agreed with the plaintiff.2 11
The court concluded that while the FAA provided that service
under it was to be made in the manner provided by the Federal
Rules, this referred only to the manner in which notice is sent and
not to the specific time provisions of the Federal Rules. The court
next addressed the fact that the plaintiff used Form 18-A. The
court found that because the plaintiff had coupled its petition for
arbitration with a complaint for declaratory judgment, the twenty-
day period of the Federal Rules applied only to the underlying
complaint and did not extend to the petition. Thus, while an an-
swer to the complaint was not due until February 20, 1985, a re-
sponse to the petition could be made due any time after January
23, 1985.212
2. The Unspecified Deadline of Rule 4(g)
Rule 4(g) states that after service is made, the party making
service must file an affidavit to that effect with the court. In cases
where service has been made pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the
Rule directs that, "return shall be made by the sender's filing with
the court the acknowledgment received pursuant to such
subdivision. ' '213
In Morse v. Elmira Country Club,214 the plaintiff attempted to
make service by mailing process to the defendant pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). When the defendant refused to acknowledge the ser-
209 Id. at 525-26.
2.0 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). For a general discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act, see
Healy, An Introduction to the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 J. MA& L. & CoM. 223 (1982).
211 See Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of America v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d
524, 526 (1st Cir. 1985).
212 See id.
213 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(g).
214 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
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vice, the plaintiff effected personal service. In the course of its
opinion, the Second Circuit considered the effect of Rule 4(g) on
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) service. The court concluded that when the
plaintiff's mail service was not acknowledged by the defendant,
then:
It may well be that, under the literal terms of Rule 4(g), plaintiff
could not make proof of service without the subsequent personal
service. However, service may be effective without a return. Rule
4(g) provides that "[flailure to make proof of service does not af-
fect the validly of the service." [citation omitted] ... The appar-
ent purpose of the second service-to provide a foundation for
the return-is another indication that it is irrelevant for valid and
effective service.2 15
In Zisman v. Sieger,21 the court provided further comment on
the interplay between Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(g). Relying heavily
on Morse, the court explained that the purpose of Rule 4(g) was to
make clear that the defendant had to receive actual notice of the
suit. Thus, if the mailed service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) does not
succeed, a plaintiff must effect personal service. In the court's
opinion, Rule 4(g) forces the plaintiff to undertake personal service
if the acknowledgment form is not returned by the defendant. 1 '
However, the court then noted that if the defendant had actual
notice of the suit from the mailed service, failure to return the ac-
knowledgment form would not invalidate the mailed service. In
Zisman, the third-party defendant had refused to return the ac-
knowledgment form but knew of the suit through its wholly-owned
subsidiary. In light of this, the court held that the defendant could
not "claim that such service is ineffective merely because it refused
to return the acknowledgement."21
3. The 120-Day Deadline of Rule 4(j)
Included in the changes made to Rule 4 by Congress in 1983
was the requirement that service on a defendant be completed by
the plaintiff within 120 days of the filing of the complaint with the
court. 19 Prior to 1983, a flexible standard was used, which one
215 Id. at 36, 39-40.
21 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
217 See id. at 200.
21 Id. at 200.
219 Rule 4(j) states:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within
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writer described as resembling a tall tree swaying in a high wind.22
Rule 4(j) states that its 120-day requirement does not apply
when service is being attempted on a party in a foreign country. In
addition, the Rule provides the court with discretion to extend the
time past 120 days if there is good cause shown. In addition, since
the dismissal contemplated by the Rule is without prejudice, the
plaintiff is able to institute a new suit if the initial attempts to
effect service fail within the time period proscribed.
To date, only a few cases have considered the interaction be-
tween Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j). In Cool v. Police Department
of the City of Yonkers,221 the plaintiff filed a complaint in March,
1976. In December, 1979, the complaint was amended and in June,
1984 an attempt was made to serve a number of the defendants
pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). These defendants refused to ac-
knowledge the mail service. Before the plaintiff attempted personal
service, the defendants moved for an order dismissing the suit on
the grounds that the strictures of Rule 4(j) had not been met. The
court agreed with the defendants and granted their motion. The
court found that, "[s]ervice of the amended complaint was not at-
tempted until four and one half years after it was filed. It is just
this type of dilatory non-action that Rule 4(j) is designed to
eliminate. ' '222
In Montalbano v. Easco Hand Tools, Inc.,223 the third-party
plaintiff attempted to effect service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
on a third-party Japanese defendant by serving the defendant's
supposed American agent. It was determined that the American
defendant was not the agent of the Japanese defendant, and that
the Japanese defendant had no contacts with New York. The Sec-
ond Circuit therefore affirmed the dismissal of the third party
plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the 120-day deadline of
Rule 4(j) had passed. The third-party plaintiff argued that it
120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such
service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made
within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without
prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon mo-
tion. This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to
subdivision (i) of this rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j).
220 Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 101.
221 No. 76 Civ. 1303 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
222 Id.
223 766 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1985).
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should not be held to the 4(j) deadline because of that Rule's for-
eign country exception. The court disagreed, noting that the third
party plaintiff had "never attempted to serve process in a foreign
country," and that the time limit was "especially" applicable
"since [the third party plaintiff] has not exactly bent over back-
wards to effect service.M2 4
The next case to juxtapose Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 4(j) was
Shuster v. Conley.225 In Shuster, the plaintiffs twice mailed service
to the defendant in accordance with the procedures set forth in
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The mailings were returned marked "insuffi-
cient address," and plaintiffs' letter to the postal service requesting
defendant's address was answered with "address not known." The
plaintiff then contended that the defendant was attempting to
avoid service by concealing his whereabouts. On the 122d day after
the complaint had been filed, the plaintiff moved for an extension
of time in which to effect service. The court denied the request,
finding that the plaintiffs did not make a diligent effort to locate
the defendant and noted that "[i]nadvertant or heedless nonser-
vice is precisely what Rule 4(j) was designed to prevent."22
In a more recent case, Watts v. Lyon,s27 the plaintiff at-
tempted to effect service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) by mailing a
copy of the summons and complaint to what was believed to be an
agent of the defendant, but who in fact was not. Moreover, the
mailing was defective because it did not enclose all of the required
forms. By the time these mistakes became known to the plaintiff,
the statute of limitations had run. Thus, the defendant argued, in-
ter alia, that the suit should be dismissed with prejudice.2s
The court indicated that it was not clear on what basis the
defendant thought the complaint should be dismissed, since the
complaint had been filed prior to the running of the statute. The
court noted, however, that if the defendant was arguing that the
complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to com-
ply with the Rule 4(j) due diligence requirement and that such due
diligence was necessary to toll the statute, there was merit to such
224 Id. at 738, 740.
225 107 F.R.D. 755 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
2 Id. at 757. The court also denied a request by plaintiffs for permission to serve by
publication holding that "personal service is mandatory" once service by mail is unsuccess-
fully attempted under Rule 4(c)(2)(c)(ii). See id.
227 No. 84-2593 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
228 Id.
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an argument. The court decided that, before dismissing the suit
without prejudice under Rule 4(j), the plaintiff would be given an
opportunity to "establish, by affidavit or other competent evi-
dence, not only why he failed initially to serve [the] defendant
properly, but also why, after defendant first raised the issue of in-
sufficient service, he failed to perfect service upon defendant by
alternative means." '29 The court explained that it was giving the
plaintiff this opportunity because the plaintiff was appearing pro
se.
23 0
G. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and Statutes of Limitation
The interplay between Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and the statute of
limitations presents a timing problem which deserves special men-
tion. The leading case in this area is Morse v. Elmira Country
Club.23' In Morse, the plaintiff alleged that she had suffered inju-
ries on June 28, 1980, while dancing on the defendant's dance floor.
Her complaint was filed on May 23, 1983, and on May 25, 1983, her
attorney mailed copies of the summons, complaint, and acknowl-
edgment forms in accordance with 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendant
did not return the acknowledgment and, on August 5, 1983, de-
fendant's attorney advised plaintiff's attorney that the acknowl-
edgment form would not be returned. Plaintiff then personally
served the defendant on August 30, 1983, three years and 63 days
after the claim arose. In New York, the statute of limitations for
torts is three years.232
The defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that the
claim was time-barred, and the district court dismissed the suit.
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.
The court noted that since this was a diversity suit, New York law
governed the statute of limitations question and in New York, the
statute is not tolled until service of the defendant has actually
been made. The court also noted that the Federal Rules controlled
the proper method of service and, therefore, held that service on
the defendant had been achieved when the defendant received the
229 Id.
210 Id. For another case in which service was attempted pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
and the court lessened the requirements of Rule 4(j) because the plaintiff was proceeding
pro se, see Pimperl v. Information Resources, Inc., No. 83 C 9562 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1984)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
231 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
232 Id. at 36; see also N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 214(5) (McKinney 1985).
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unacknowledged mail service in May, 1983, prior to the running of
the statute. The court rejected the defendant's contention that un-
acknowledged mail service was invalid and stated that the require-
ment in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of follow up personal service was
designed only so that the plaintiff could make proof of service pur-
suant to 4(g).233
The court supported this decision with an analysis of the his-
tory and purposes of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and concluded:
Above all, strong factors of justice and equity push toward
reading Rule 4(c) as providing for effective mail service where, as
here, the recipient actually receives the mail service but refuses to
acknowledge it properly. We have been given no adequate expla-
nation why the acknowledgment was withheld here, nor any
proper basis for nullifying mail service deliberately left unac-
knowledged. Certainly, the desire to harass or inconvenience
plaintiff, or to delay the tolling of limitations, should not be an
excuse or a reason to interpret the rule against plaintiff. There is,
in other words, no rationale for allowing a properly served de-
fendant deliberately and willfully to postpone the ending of limi-
tations by simply refusing to do what the rule calls upon him to
do. In short, Congress would have no ground for providing that
proper and known mail service would become ineffective simply
because the defendant, without reason, acted like the dog in the
manger.8 4
A similar result was reached by the Eighth Circuit in Elisadle
v. International Association of Machinists.2 " In Elisadle, a former
employee of TWA brought suit against both the airline for firing
him, and against the union for refusing to continue to represent
him in grievance proceedings against the airline. The plaintiff
served both defendants under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
The airline acknowledged receipt of the summons and com-
plaint but the union did not, thereby forcing the plaintiff to per-
sonally serve the union. The union then moved for dismissal on the
ground that the plaintiff had not effected service on either the air-
line or the union until approximately seven to eight months after
being told by the union that it would no longer represent him. The
133 See 752 F.2d at 36-37; see also N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 203(a), (b) (McKinney 1985).
"1 752 F.2d at 40. Cf. Bell v. London, 580 F. Supp. 62, 63-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same
result reached on similar facts but pursuant to Rule 4(d)(8), service by mail rule which
Supreme Court proposed but which Congress rejected in favor of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
235 792 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1986).
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union contended that this violated the six-month statute of limita-
tions of the National Labor Relations Act.2 36
The court held for the plaintiff. Since the basis for plaintiff's
suit was federal question jurisdiction, the court was able to take
advantage of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
deems an action commenced for limitations purposes at the time
the complaint is filed. Thus, unlike the Second Circuit which was
forced to look at state law in Morse because of diversity jurisdic-
tion, the Eighth Circuit was able to easily brush aside the defend-
ant's claim that the suit was untimely by looking to federal law.237
H. Costs Recoverable by the Plaintiff
In drafting Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), Congress provided only one
penalty for those situations where the defendant refuses or fails to
acknowledge the plaintiff's mailing. If the plaintiff effects personal
service after the defendant fails or refuses to send back the ac-
knowledgment form, the plaintiff may recover the costs of personal
service unless the defendant is able to show good cause for not
awarding the plaintiff costs. This provision is contained in Rule
4(c)(2)(D). 238 Among the issues raised by 4(c)(2)(D) are: 1) what
constitutes good cause; 2) are any other penalties available; and, 3)
do costs include attorneys' fees?
The first case to deal with Rule 4(c)(2)(D) was Sally Beauty
Co., Inc. v. Nexxus Products Co., Inc. 239 In Sally, the plaintiff ef-
fected service on the defendant by mail in accordance with Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendant's attorney refused to sign and return
218 See id. at 115; 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(b), 185 (1982). For other cases which have consid-
ered the statute's six-month statute of limitation where service was attempted by mail pur-
suant to Rule 4(c)(2)(c)(ii), see Ellenbogen v. Rider Maintenace Corp., 794 F.2d 768, 770-72
(2d Cir. 1986); Waldron v. Motor Coils Mfg. Co., 606 F. Supp. 658, 658-59 (W.D. Pa. 1985),
ajf'd, 791 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1986).
217 See 792 F.2d at 115; FED. R. Civ. P. 3. Cf. Goodman v. Diaz, 646 F. Supp. 52, 54
(M.D. Ga. 1986) (under state law, personal service following defective mail service related
back to date of filing and action therefore timely).
2" The Rule states:
Unless good cause is shown for not doing so the court shall order the payment of
the costs of personal service by the person served if such person does not complete
and return within 20 days after mailing, the notice and acknowledgment of receipt
of summons.
FED. R Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(D). For a case in which the court assessed costs after the defendant
failed to demonstrate good cause, see FDIC v. Blackburn, 109 F.R.D. 66, 75-76 (E.D. Tenn.
1985).
I'l 578 F. Supp. 178 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (mem.).
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the acknowledgment form unless he was granted additional time
by the plaintiff to appear. Instead of granting additional time, the
plaintiff effected personal service. Once personal service was com-
plete, the plaintiff sought an order directing the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff $307.32, the cost of hiring a special process server.
The court granted the plaintiff's request, finding that "[t]here is
no authority under the rule [4(c) (2) (C) (ii)] authorizing the imposi-
tion of a condition upon the acknowledgment of service such as the
insistence upon a stipulated extension of time."24
Subsequently, in Eden Foods, Inc. v. Eden's Own Products,
Inc.,241 the plaintiff served the defendants by mail. When the de-
fendants failed to respond, the plaintiff effected personal service
and then sought $59.25, the cost of such personal service. The
court granted the plaintiff's request, finding that "[t]he only means
for enforcing this inexpensive method of service" by mail is to
award costs if the plaintiff makes personal service. Since the plain-
tiff had made such service, the court ordered the defendants to pay
the plaintiff's costs "within 10 days of the date of this order or a
default judgment will be entered against the offending defend-
ant. ' 242 It is interesting that the court coupled its order with the
threat of entering a default judgment if the costs remained unpaid
for more than ten days, because Rule 4(c)(2)(D) says nothing
about such default judgments. Apparently, the court was moti-
vated by the fact that the defendants had not responded to the
mail service.
The next case to discuss Rule 4(c)(2)(D) did so in dictum. In
Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Building Systems, Inc.,243 the
plaintiff's attorney neglected to enclose the required self-ad-
dressed, stamped envelope. In a footnote the court wrote, "[t]hat
neglect may have foreclosed a possible claim for reimbursement of
the cost of effecting personal service. '2 44
Billy v. Ashland Oil, Inc.2 45 presented an interesting use of
Rule 4(c)(2)(D). In Billy, a default judgment was entered when the
defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff's attempt at mail ser-
vice under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). When the defendant moved to va-
240 Id. at 179.
2M 101 F.R.D. 96 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
242 Id. at 96.
212 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984).
24. Id. at 1089 n.1.
245 102 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
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cate the default judgment, the court reluctantly did so on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to follow the unsuccessful attempt
at mail service with personal service within thirty days of the or-
der. However, the court ordered the defendant to pay the costs of
the service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(D).248
The result reached in Billy is very interesting in light of the
result reached a few months later in Crocker National Bank v. Fox
& Co.247 Crocker raised the issue as to when a plaintiff may bring a
motion for costs under Rule 4(c)(2)(D). The case involved a com-
plex set of securities fraud actions in which the plaintiffs sued ap-
proximately 400 present and former partners of a national ac-
counting firm. The plaintiffs mailed service pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) to each defendant. Only two of the defendants ac-
knowledged the service. The plaintiffs then personally served 118
of the 398 defendants who did not respond, and moved for the
costs of such service in an apparent attempt to induce the remain-
ing 280 defendants to return their acknowledgments. Prior to the
plaintiffs' Rule 4(c)(2)(D) motion, the court stayed all other mo-
tions in the case pending certain negotiations.
The court ruled that the plaintiff's motion for costs was pre-
mature, stating that such a motion could not be brought until:
the time the defendants must contest in personam jurisdiction or
waive all objections to it.... [A] Rule 4 motion is properly heard
at the same time that a Rule 12(b)(2) motion must be made
under Rule 12(h). [citation omitted] Since defendants cannot
raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction until the stay is
lifted, plaintiffs must also wait.248
The plaintiff in Henry v. Glaize Maryland Orchards, Inc. 249
faced a similar situation. Henry involved a plaintiff's attempted
service by mail pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2) (C) (ii). 21 ° Service was sent
by certified mail, return receipt requested. The envelope was not
claimed by the defendant, and after twenty-five days, returned by
the postal service.251
Upon receiving the unclaimed envelope, the plaintiffs then ef-
2I See id. at 231-35.
247 103 F.R.D. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
246 Id. at 392.
249 103 F.R.D. 589 (D. Md. 1984).
210 Id. at 590-91.
211 Id. at 591. The court indicated that it would be unjust to hold the defendant liable
for failing to comply with instructions on a form it never received. See id. at 590.
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fected personal service, and moved for the costs of such service.
The defendant did not oppose the plaintiff's motion but the court
nevertheless denied it. The court explained that "[iut is uncontro-
verted that the defendant here never received the form 18-A no-
tices in plaintiffs' initial attempt at service. Defendant's silence
notwithstanding, the Court will not order it to pay the costs in-
curred by plaintiffs in their subsequent employment of a process
server."
252
In Wall v. Jacobs,253 the plaintiff filed a section 1983 suit al-
leging that the defendants had interfered with his right to parole.
Plaintiff attempted service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), and de-
fendants in due course signed and returned the acknowledgment
form. When the form was received by the plaintiff, however, the
"date of receipt" stamp had been obliterated. Plaintiff contended
that this date had been obliterated in order to confuse the court as
to when service had been made. Plaintiff therefore moved the
court for an order directing the defendants' counsel to withdraw
his appearance. The court refused, stating that, "Rule 4(c)(2)(D)
provides that the only sanction that may be imposed against a per-
son not complying with the twenty day rule is to order the pay-
ment, by such person, of the cost of alternative service."'25
Another case that discussed Rule 4(c)(2)(D) was Reno Distrib-
utors, Inc. v. West Texas Oil Field Equipment, Inc.2 "55 In Reno,
the plaintiff attempted service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) on
two occasions. The first envelope was returned to the plaintiff
marked "insufficient address." The second envelope, mailed to a
different address, was returned marked "not deliverable as ad-
dressed," and also contained a handwritten notation, "opened in
error-not at this box number." Plaintiff thereafter effected per-
sonal service on the defendants and then moved for the costs of
personal service.2 56
The plaintiff contended that the defendants had received the
second envelope and that it was the defendants who had written
"opened in error." The defendants argued that they never received
either envelope. The court agreed with the defendants and noted
252 Id. at 591.
253 No. 84-5744 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
25 Id. The court also noted that no "date of receipt" stamp need be applied to the
acknowledgment form in the first place. See id.
25. 105 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan. 1985).
256 Id. at 514.
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that the
[p]laintiff has presented no evidence to support its contention
that defendants opened the second envelope and then returned it.
The court would be indulging in sheer speculation to conclude
that defendants engaged in the devious activity alleged. It would
be equally plausible to assume that plaintiff incorrectly addressed
the envelopes or that the post office improperly delivered the
envelopes. 2 7
Subsequently, in Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Gable,258 the court
made it clear that the only penalty which can be visited upon a
defendant who refuses to respond to mail service under Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is the awarding of costs if the plaintiff subsequently
makes personal service. The court noted that "[it is a] fact, obvi-
ous from Rule 4(c)(2)(D), that the only consequence of a defend-
ant's ignoring mail service is to impose on that defendant the cost
of subsequent personal service-not, as with ignoring original per-
sonal service, the risk of a default judgment. '259
In Perkin Elmer (Computer Systems Division) v. Trans Med-
iterranean Airways, S.A.L., 60 the plaintiff mailed service in accor-
dance with the procedures set forth in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Plaintiff
received from the defendant a copy of the letter sent by the de-
fendant to the defendant's attorney acknowledging receipt of the
summons. Unsure whether this letter constituted a sufficient ac-
knowledgment, the plaintiff then effected personal service on the
defendant and thereafter moved for costs. The court agreed that
the plaintiff was entitled to costs and stated:
A contrary holding would ignore the language of the Rule, evis-
cerate the incentive to return the acknowledgment form that
Congress intended the Rule to provide, and require plaintiff ei-
ther to take the risk that the document received would later be
found insufficient or to incur the potentially unreimbursable cost
of personal service.21
One of the more interesting cases in this area is C.LT. Leasing
Corp. v. Manth Machine & Tool Corp.26 2 In C.LT., the plaintiff
moved for both the actual cost of making personal service and the
257 Id.
258 105 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. M. 1985) (mem.).
29 Id. at 545 n.5.
260 107 F.R.D. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
211 Id. at 60.
262 No. 85-261C (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985).
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attorneys' fees involved in effecting such personal service. The
court granted both, finding that if not for the defendant's unrea-
sonable refusal to acknowledge the mailed service, the plaintiff
would not have been forced to make personal service.2"'
No case before or since C.I. T. has awarded attorneys' fees, and
it is therefore impossible to say whether attorneys' fees will be
awarded in future cases. Although there is nothing in the language
of Rule 4(c)(2)(D) which prohibits an award of attorneys' fees, in
numerous other contexts federal courts have repeatedly stated that
attorneys' fees are not recoverable unless there is an affirmative
provision in the statute empowering the court to award such
fees.26 4 These cases, of course, do no more than follow the Ameri-
can rule (in contrast to the English rule) under which each party is
expected to bear its own legal costs.265 Although one commentator
has called the result in C.I.T. necessary if plaintiffs are to have the
necessary incentive to bring 4(c)(2)(D) claims,266 the number of
such claims made to date do not support this conclusion.
In United States ex rel. Itri Brick & Concrete Corp. v. Union
Indemnity Insurance Co. of New York,267 the court awarded
$67.50 after the court found that the defendant, an insurance com-
pany, had engaged in a deliberate pattern of refusing to acknowl-
edge the plaintiff's mail service.2 68
In Fee v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc. ,269 the court awarded
the greatest costs recovered by a plaintiff to date. In that wrongful
death case, the plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant by Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The defendant refused to acknowledge the service
and told the plaintiff that he expected to be served personally.
Thereafter, the plaintiff attempted on more than thirty occasions
to serve the defendant, but each time the defendant thwarted the
process server. Finally, the process server was able to make the ser-
283 Id.
I" See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
Jarvis, Expanding the Carrier's Right to Claim Indemnity Under Section 3(5) of COGSA
for Inaccurate Bills of Lading, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 811, 830 (1986) (attorneys' fees not recover-
able under maritime statute which allows the successful party to recover its "costs" in bring-
ing suit).
282 Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247.
288 See Siegel, Practice Commentaries on FRCP 4, 28 U.S.C.A. at C4-19 (West Supp.
1987) [hereinafter 1986 Commentary].
207 109 F.R.D. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
288 Id. at 156.
', No. 84-2323 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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vice. The plaintiff then moved for $1,628.47, the costs for these
numerous service attempts. The court granted these costs, finding
that in light of the defendant's conduct, there was "no reason why
costs should not be assessed against it. 270
The next case to consider the awarding of costs under Rule
4(c)(2)(D) was Gear, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc.2 M In Gear,
the plaintiff attempted service by mail under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
When the defendants failed to return the acknowledgement form,
the plaintiff attempted personal service and then moved the court
for the cost of such service. Since the defendants were unable to
show that there was good cause not to assess costs, the court or-
dered the defendants to pay the costs of the personal service. 2
A more recent case of this type is Allright Missouri, Inc. v.
Billeter27 3 which involved an allegation that the defendants had
committed RICO violations in connection with a limited partner-
ship.27 4 The plaintiff attempted to recover costs for service on the
numerous defendants by employing Rule 4(c)(2)(D). The court
found this request proper, noting that, "[f]ailure to return the no-
tice and acknowledgment form upon receipt of mail service is not a
proper means of challenging the jurisdiction of the Court. ' 275
V. COMMENTATORS AND RULE 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
Although the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure immediately received much attention from commenta-
tors, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was largely glossed over. 6 Instead, com-
mentators focused on the amendments to Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26,
which primarily involve certification requirements for all papers
filed with the court and sanctions imposable on attorneys for dila-
tory pre-trial and discovery procedures.2 17 Only with the passage of
270 Id.
271 No. 85 Civ. 5754 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
272 Id.
217 631 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
274 Id. at 1328-29.
270 Id. at 1330.
217 See 2 J. MooRE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
4.01 (2d ed. 1984). However, since Professor Moore's work surveys all of the Federal Rules
and is intended as a quick reference tool, his comments on Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) amount to no
more than a "how-to" guide for the busy practitioner.
2177 Rule 7, entitled, "Pleadings Allowed; Form of Motions," was amended in 1983 to
include subparagraph (b)(3), which states as follows: "All motions shall be signed in accor-
dance with Rule 11." FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3). Rule 11, entitled, "Signing of Pleadings, Mo-
tions, and Other Papers; Sanctions," was amended in 1983 to "reduce the reluctance of
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three years and the emergence of substantial case law, did Rule
4(c) (2) (C) (ii) begin to attract serious attention from commentators.
Unfortunately, even when commentators have addressed Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), they often have been perplexed by the inconsisten-
cies inherent in it. As a result, while often recognizing many of the
problems with the language and application of the Rule, the writ-
ers sometimes have misconstrued the details that complicate what
appears to be an easily misunderstood rule.
A. Early Commentators
1. Applicability of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
In an early report from the House of Representatives' Com-
mittee on the Judiciary,28 it was made clear that Congress' intent
was to provide a smooth transition between methods of service, ac-
knowledging the potential confusion among the effective dates of
the Supreme Court Rules, the proposed congressional amend-
ments, and the pre-existing rules.279 Although courts were quickly
confronted with issues concerning the efficacy of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
in actions which were initiated before its effective date, February
26, 1983,280 only Professor David Siegel, in the second of his three
relevant practice commentaries, discussed possible problems of
transition."" Professor Siegel emphasized that if counsel is unsure
of the applicability of a Rule 4 provision during the transition pe-
courts to impose sanctions, . . .by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and
reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory
Committee Note. Rule 16, governing "Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management," was
amended for the first time in 1983 to address complaints that its misuse often led to over-
abundant pre-trial conferencing in some cases, insufficient pre-trial conferencing in other
cases, and inadequate case management in general. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Rule 26, entitled,
"General Provisions Governing Discovery," was amended in 1983 to limit the scope of dis-
covery proceedings, discourage redundant, irrelevant, and excessive discovery, and provide
sanctions for abusive discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. For a varied sampling of the early discus-
sions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 11, 16, and 26, see Long, supra note 10; Hall,
supra note 10; Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363 (1983);
Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease
the Pain?, 15 TEx. TECH L. REV. 887 (1984).
278 96 F.R.D. 81, 116 (1983).
2179 Id. at 134 n.5.
280 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
281 See Siegel, Practice Commentaries on FRCP 4, 28 U.S.C.A. at C4-6 (West Supp.
1986) [hereinafter 1985 Commentary].
[Vol. 61:1
RULE 4(c) (2) (C) (ii)
riod, he should avoid that provision if at all possible.282 Because of
the nature of Rule 4, Professor Siegel additionally noted that the
forty-five-day delay between the passage of the amendment and its
effective date was insufficient to provide the practicing bar with
sufficient time to become aware of the changes and to adjust ac-
cordingly. This delay may have provided "adequate notice for
amendments that touch only the incidentals of an action, but not
for one that prescribes its beginning. '283
2. Out-of-State Defendants
A second important aspect of the Rule that has not been ade-
quately addressed by commentators has been the availability of
mail service on out-of-state defendants under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
Perhaps the lack of attention was based on the assumption by
many that this application was understood; case law has shown
this to be untrue.28 4
In his 1985 practice commentary, Professor Siegel discussed
the questions posed by the overlap of Rules 4(c), 4(e), and 4(f).2 5
Although he warned that if a state long-arm statute is invoked, the
practitioner should use state methods of service rather than the
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) mail service, Professor Siegel indicated that the po-
tential advantages of mail service may warrant its attempt, pro-
vided there is sufficient time under the applicable statute of limita-
tions to commence a new suit should the court decide against out-
of-state mail service.288 One year later, with some case law at his
disposal, Professor Siegel concluded that service under Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is not available if the defendant is not present in the
forum state.287
Two early discussions illustrated the confusion surrounding
out-of-state service by mail. In a 1983 article, Professor George
Walker called for clarification of the various provisions addressing
out-of-state service contained in Rule 4.28 Although Professor
282 See Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 92-94.
282 Id. at 94.
284 See supra notes 45-99 and accompanying text.
1985 Commentary, supra note 281, at C4-30.
288 Id. at C4-20, C4-27, C4-30.
2817 1986 Commentary, supra note 266, at C4-30.
2 Walker, The 1983 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 - Process,
Jurisdiction, and Erie Principles Revisited, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957 (1983). The arti-
cle, a useful comparison of the methods of mail service provided respectively by federal,
California, and North Carolina statutes, proposes that North Carolina legislators carefully
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Walker discussed the overlap and redundancies in Rules
4(c)(2)(C)(ii), 4(d), and 4(e), he omitted any discussion of the ex-
traterritorial aspects of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Apparently, the article
was written for the North Carolina practioner familiar with that
state's provision for service by certified mail,"" and therefore, the
article was concerned more with the distinction between methods
of mail service rather than with the federal provisions themselves.
A 1984 Comment called for an amendment to Rule 4 allowing
service pursuant to state law subsequent to failed service under
Rule 4(c) (2) (C)(ii).290 This writer questioned the applicability of
Rule 4(f)'s territorial restrictions on mail service and the ability to
follow ineffective extraterritorial mail service with service under
4(e).291 While it raised important issues, the article failed to con-
sider the relevant case law which had developed prior to the time
of publication.
The issue of whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) may be used to effect
service abroad and the Rule's relationship to the Hague Conven-
tion292 was discussed extensively in another article.293 This article
pointed out the potential conflict between Article 10 of the Con-
vention, which has been expressly rejected by many of the nations
that otherwise are parties to the Convention,294 and Rule
4(c) (2) (C) (ii). Acknowledging the possible benefits of mail service,
the authors concluded that if mail service under the Rule is sus-
tained, and a favorable judgment subsequently rendered, enforce-
ment of that judgment outside of the United States may prove es-
pecially problematic, particularly in those countries that have
formally spurned Article 10 of the Hague Convention.9 5 Professor
Siegel briefly discussed this issue in his 1986 Commentary9 6 and
argued that since countries ratifying the Convention may express
their disapproval of mail service, their failure to object should be a
monitor the federal court's reactions to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and
4(j), and consider amendments to the North Carolina statutes accordingly. See id. at 982-86.
299 See N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1)(c), 4(j)(2) (1983) (service by registered or certified mail).
290 Comment, supra note 19, at 577-79.
291 See id. at 578.
292 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Convention, its
interplay with Federal Rule 4, and cases that construe it, see supra notes'104, 109, 115-119,
and accompanying text.
291 See Newman & Burrows, Mailed Service Outside the U.S. in Federal Cases,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
294 See supra note 106.
29 Newman & Burrows, supra note 293, at 3, col. 1.
291 1986 Commentary, supra note 266, at C4-34.
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sufficient basis for allowing this method of service.2917
3. Enclosure Requirement
One of the first problems to be recognized and discussed was
the level of compliance needed to meet the enclosure requirements
of 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Many cases have contained arguments asking the
court to quash service due to typographical errors,9 s omissions of
one or more of the enclosures,"" or, most frequently, the interpre-
tation of the Rule's requirement for a "notice and acknowledgment
conforming substantially to form 18-A."3 0
Despite the number of cases involving enclosure requirements,
the only mention of these cases made in other commentaries was a
footnote citing Armco.30 1 This lack of commentary is disconcerting
in light of both the ease with which technical but potentially fatal
errors can be made and the potential for abuse by either party.302
It clearly has become the plaintiff's obligation to dutifully fol-
low the enclosure requirements and to serve them within the pre-
scribed time limits. As Professor Siegel has advised, plaintiff's
counsel should not employ the federal mail service provisions if a
statute of limitations deadline is nearing.303 Employing Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) in such cases would provide the defendant with a
"temptation" to willfully refuse to sign and return the notice and
acknowledgment form.304
4. Failure to Return the Acknowledgment Form
The advantage of mail service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) de-
pends entirely on the willingness of the defendant. It was sug-
gested that if defendants refuse to acknowledge service, the time
and expense of the plaintiffs and the courts will be unnecessarily
wasted.30 5 If the plaintiff does not receive an executed notice and
207 Id. at C4-27.
208 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 126-27, 131-141, and accompanying text.
200 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii); supra note 35. For a discussion of illustrative cases,
see supra notes 122-25, 128-30 and accompanying text.
201 See Comment, supra note 19, at 574 n.54, 578-79.
202 It is especially disconcerting that while the amendments to Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26
increase attorney responsibility, the sloppy drafting of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) encourages uneth-
ical attorney practices.
120 1985 Commentary, supra note 281, at C4-42.
20- Id. at C4-19, C4-20.
200 Note, supra note 6, at 1018.
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acknowledgment back from the defendant within twenty days from
plaintiff's mailing, subsequent personal service must be effected."0 6
Plaintiff's only remedy is the cost of such personal service unless
defendant can show "good cause" why costs should not be
awarded.0
A 1984 Note suggested three possibilities as to what might
constitute good cause for not returning the acknowledgment
form.3 0 8 Two of the possibilities, that the defendant was traveling
and did not receive the process until after the twenty day period
had expired and that the defendant did not speak English and
therefore could not read the process or understand its command to
return the acknowledgment, have not been tested in the federal
courts. The third possibility, that the process was mailed to an in-
correct address, was an issue in Reno,30 9 and there the court denied
the motion for costs of personal service.3 10
Professor Siegel has argued that if good cause for failing to
return the acknowledgment could not be shown, stronger penalties
than those explicitly mandated by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) should be
imposed. In particular, he considered it to be proper to award at-
torneys' fees to compensate the plaintiff for having to arrange for
subsequent personal service.311 In light of this possibility, Professor
Siegel suggested that attorneys should carefully record their time
so as to accurately reflect all pertinent action on their part. 1 2
Courts, for the most part, have upheld the rigid provision of
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) requiring subsequent personal service in cases
in which the defendant either willfully failed to execute and return
the acknowledgment form or cases in which someone other than
the defendant itself signed the form. Attempts by plaintiffs to
avoid follow up personal service when it is apparent that the
defendant has received the mailing, or attempts to enforce default
judgments entered for a defendant's failure to enter a reply, have
been unsuccessful.3 13
306 See supra notes 142-180 and accompanying text.
307 FED. R. Cv. P. 4(c)(2)(D). For cases which have construed the rule, see supra notes
238-275 and accompanying text.
101 Note, supra note 6, at 1016-18.
309 105 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan. 1985).
310 See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
3 1 1985 Commentary, supra note 281, at C4-19.
312 Id.
313 For a discussion of the cases which have considered this issue, see supra notes 142-
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More recently, however, two courts considering this issue, have
indicated displeasure with what they believed to be the defend-
ants' effort to frustrate the system.314 These courts held that the
plaintiffs were not required to make subsequent personal service
when it was shown that the defendants actually knew about the
claims. In both of these cases, the defendants purposefully failed
to return the acknowledgment forms. Though these decisions have
yet to be commented upon by other writers, they are reflective of
the courts' increasing displeasure with the inadequacy of the pen-
alties provided by Congress.3 15
Despite the minor penalties for not doing so s*6 commentators
in general recommend that the defendants return the acknowledg-
ment as quickly as possible.3 17 However, two practitioners, drawing
on their own litigation experience, noted that defendants rarely re-
turn the forms.31 Unfortunately, little mention is made anywhere
of the ethical considerations that are most disturbingly tested by
this Rule and that heavily contribute to this Article's suggestion
that the Rule be repealed. 9
5. State Methods of Service
Shortly after the Rule's enactment, Professor Siegel ques-
tioned whether state methods of service may be employed under
"' See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
M, Cf. supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text, where the court awarded $1,628.47,
the largest award to date, after the defendant avoided thirty attempts by plaintiff to serve
process.
"' Since the only penalty for refusal to acknowledge the mailed service is the relatively
small cost incurred by the plaintiff to make subsequent personal service (typically no more
than fifty dollars), there is little monetary incentive for defendants to sign and return the
acknowledgment form. The defendant may have more incentive to return the form if courts
begin to assess attorneys' fees in addition to the cost of personal service. For a case in which
attorneys' fees were granted, see supra notes 262-266 and accompanying text.
M, See, e.g., 1985 Commentary, supra note 281, at C4-20.
318 See Newman & Burrows, supra note 293, at 16, col. 6, n.53.
310 As previously stated elsewhere by one of the authors:
It is, of course, the ethical duty of a lawyer to improve the administration of jus-
tice. It is also the ethical duty of a lawyer to further his client's cause. These two
demands place the lawyer in an impossible situation: by delaying legal proceed-
ings, he helps his client but fails in his obligation as a court officer. By pushing
foward, he fulfills his duty to the tribunal but not to his client. The problem does
not admit of an easy answer.
Jarvis, The Problem of Post-Hearing Delay in Maritime Arbitrations: "When Did You Say
We Would Receive the Arbitrators' Award?", 9 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 19, 22 n.9 (1985)
(citations omitted).
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Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) after mail service has failed.320 In view of the
lack of an express provision permitting it, Professor Siegel initially
advised the plaintiff not to attempt state methods, nor to permit a
process server attempting personal service to use mail service.321
By 1986, Professor Siegel had become more certain of the unavail-
ability of state methods once service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) had
failed. However, he noted that if mail service was initially at-
tempted under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), a subsequent service pursuant to
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) would probably be acceptable.2 2
Professor Walker, referring to Professor Siegel's 1983 com-
ments, questioned the availability of service under Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i) after a failed attempt at Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) service.32 3
Professor Walker contended that the use of the word "or" between
Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) implied that if service under
either Rule fails, service under the other rule may follow.324
Since that time, it has become apparent that once service
under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) has been attempted, the subsequent
shifting of service devices is not permitted. Relying heavily upon
325Armco v. Penrod-Stauffer Building Systems, one writer advised
that a plaintiff attempting to mail service under state law should
not include Form 18-A, or a form that might otherwise be con-
strued as to conform to Form 18-A, since it would imply service
under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and lock the plaintiff into compliance
with the federal method.3 26
This has been a particular point of discussion in California
327
and North Carolina3 28 where mail service has been adopted as a
state method of service. Writing before the 1983 amendments were
enacted, but while they were under consideration, Professor Wil-
liam Slomanson compared California's mail service provisions with
the then-proposed, but later rejected, federal certified mail provi-
320 Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 1, at 96.
321 Id.
322 1986 Commentary, supra note 266, at C4-18.
3 See Walker, supra note 288, at 970.
324 Id.
325 See 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984) (unacknowledged mail service under Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) precludes use of otherwise acceptable state methods); Comment, supra note
19, at 574.
226 Id.
327 See supra note 26.
328 See supra note 289.
[Vol. 61:1
RULE 4(c) (2) (C) (ii)
sion. 29 Although some of the comparisons are no longer timely be-
cause the Rule as finally enacted is substantially different from
that under review at the time of Professor Slomanson's comments,
the article is a reminder that parties must be cognizant of which
set of laws control a particular mail service.
Professor Walker commented on the situation in North Caro-
lina where service is permitted by certified mail in a manner simi-
lar to the one proposed by the Supreme Court and later rejected
by Congress.330 He called North Carolina's system a "clear alterna-
tive for the Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) acknowledgment method, 331 but
failed to provide a useful discussion of the comparative
advantages.
6. Deadlines Under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
The deadlines in connection with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) have been
addressed extensively by commentators. Discussions range from
descriptive to prescriptive, illustrating the contradiction and ques-
tions posed by the deadlines of the Rule itself, and, out of neces-
sity, of the Rules that interact with it.
In practice, the first deadline with which the parties must con-
tend with is the twenty-day deadline within which the defendant
must return the signed notice and acknowledgment form. The lan-
guage of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) indicates that the twenty days runs
from the date of mailing. Form 18-A, however, instructs the de-
fendant to "complete and return the form to the sender within 20
days.... "332 Professor Walter Taggart was the first commentator
to note this inconsistency, and to caution the practioner of its
pitfalls.3
The notice and acknowledgment form also informs the defend-
ant that if he returns the acknowledgment, he has twenty days
within which to answer the complaint. 34 Professor Taggart ques-
tioned when this twenty-day period commences, pointing out the
possible interpretations that may ensue335 and called for consis-
319 Slomanson, supra note 26, at 64-73.
310 See Walker, supra note 288, at 983.
331 Id. at 969.
332 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
3' See Taggart, Changing Federal Procedures in Serving Summonses and Complaints,
29 PRAC. LAW. 23, 25, 27 (1983).
334 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
335 Taggart, supra note 333, at 25, 27-32.
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tency between the summons and notice.33
It has been suggested by one commentator that the plaintiff
must wait for the twenty days to expire before attempting service
under another method.3 7 This view, however, may be incorrect
and cases have yet to address this issue.3 8 In any event, it appears
that the twenty-day period, whenever it commences and concludes,
is part of the 120 days from the time the complaint is filed in
which the plaintiff must effect service.
The 120-day deadline, proscribed by Rule 4(j), is the first fed-
eral imposition of a fixed time in which service must be made after
the complaint has been filed. If the plaintiff fails to effect proper
service within this period and cannot show "good cause" for its
failure, the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. 39 Con-
cern was expressed that in states such as California, where the
time period is fixed at three years, the state courts would be inun-
dated with cases that otherwise might have been brought in federal
court had the time in which to file not been an issue. 40 In response
to this, Professor Slomanson offered three possible alternatives.
The first alternative was to shorten the state period to align it with
the federal. The second alternative was to do away with any statu-
tory state time limit in which to serve, and leave the question of
timeliness to the court's discretion. The third, favored by Professor
Slomansen, would provide a one-year state deadline which "would
be [a] reasonable accommodation of the competing virtues of rea-
sonable diligence and litigation on the merits."' 341 Regarding this
issue, Professor Siegel has been the most instructive. Urging
throughout his commentaries that time should not be wasted in
mailing, signing, answering, and filing, he advised that "[attorneys]
should assume the worst . . . that the period [in which to file]
starts from the earliest rather than the latest possible time. '342
"' Id. at 33-34.
Note, supra note 6, at 1019.
Several interesting issues arise regarding the efficacy of a second service before the
expiration of the twenty-day period, and its effect on the statute of limitations. It would
seem that plaintiff's election to serve process before the twenty-day period has run accepts
as invalid the first service. This may become a problem if the statute of limitations has run
in the intervening time, since in making the second service, plaintiff probably has waived
any claim to having made earlier service. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
"I See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j); see also supra notes 219-230 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of cases construing Rule 4(j)).
"I0 Slomanson, supra note 26, at 64-68.
341 Id. at 71-73.
342 1985 Commentary, supra note 281, at C4-20.
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7. Statutes of Limitation and Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
Early commentators were concerned largely with Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii)'s interplay with statutes of limitations, often distin-
guishing the Rule's applicability in diversity actions from federal
question suits. They predicted that the major Rule 4 statute of
limitations question would deal with the 120-day period of Rule
4(j). Their concern largely was with the interplay between Rule 4(j)
and the state laws in diversity actions and with the danger of run-
ning the statute of limitations in federal question actions if service
is not made within 120 days.3 43 Although these writers were with-
out the advantage of any case law, subsequent writers have also
missed the point. 44
The important conflict that has arisen in this area concerns
the question of tolling the statutes of limitation and the efficacy of
mail service. The leading case addressing this issue was Morse v.
Elmira Country Club. 45 In Morse, a diversity action, the court
ruled that the statute of limitations had been tolled despite the
fact that personal service was not made until after the statute of
limitation had run.3 46 As important as the Morse ruling is, only
Professor Siegel has fully discussed its implications.3 47 The court's
frustration with the Rule, and its subsequent interpretation, de-
serve wider comment and discussion, since it incorporates the sen-
timents expressed by many earlier courts who were not faced with
a statute of limitations problem.
8. Costs and Attorneys' Fees Under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
It is clear that a plaintiff may recover the cost of effecting per-
sonal service if the notice and acknowledgment form is not re-
turned within twenty days, unless the defendant can show "good
cause" why the award should not be made.348 Whether a plaintiff
may also obtain attorneys' fees or the cost of obtaining an award is
'" See, e.g., Changes in Federal Summons Service Under Amended Rule 4 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure: Part IV-Some Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96
F.R.D. 97 (1983).
44 See, e.g., Sullivan, Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An
Overview and Words of Caution, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 83 (1985).
345 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
116 Id. at 40.
347 1985 Commentary, supra note 281, at C4-19.
M See supra notes 142-66 and acompanying text.
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far less clear.3 49 Professor Taggart interpreted 4(c)(2)(D) as not
permitting reimbursement for the cost of obtaining attorneys'
fees. 50 However, he failed to discuss what would constitute good
cause sufficient to excuse the defendant from having to pay the
cost of personal service. Professor Taggart hinted that the defend-
ant might be able to demonstrate good cause in situations where
the defendant was confused by the conflicting instructions on when
the twenty-day period commences and concludes.3 5'
9. Summary of Early Commentators
Many of the problems with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) were well-
presented in an article which depicted a light-hearted scenario
concerning the fate of a practitioner who was at first unaware of
the twists and turns of the Rule, then confused by them, and,
lastly, beaten by them. 52 The imaginary attorney confronted the
enclosure requirements, the twenty-day and 120-day deadlines, the
statue of limitations issue, the applicability of mail service for out-
of-state defendants, and other problems raised by the language of
the Rule. This article should not be overlooked because of its hu-
morous tone; its warning to the unwary is clearly serious.
In summation, early commentators generally were unable to
predict the consequences of the 1983 amendments, perhaps be-
cause the amendments seemed so unambiguous. It is indicative of
the revealed incomprehensibility of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) that such a
learned group as the foregoing writers exhibited confusion and
misunderstanding.
B. Later Commentators
The mounting confusion in the courts and among early com-
mentators led to the appearance of two articles which directly ad-
dress the problems of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Writing with a substan-
tial body of case law, these commentators call for changes in the
Rule in order to make the Rule work as Congress had intended.
"' For a case which has dealt with this question, see supra notes 262-66.
3'0 Taggart, supra note 333, at 25.
81 Id. at 25, 27.
32 Gaines, Rule 4: A Nightmare in Several Acts, LITIGATION 8 (Winter 1985).
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1. Deadlines and Sanctions Under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
In the earlier of the two articles, Professor Linda Mullenix fo-
cuses on the various deadlines set forth in Rule 4,353 paying partic-
ular attention to Rule 40) and its statute of limitations implica-
tions.3 5 4 In addition, Professor Mullenix explores the inter-
relationship between the federal and state service methods which
are authorized by Rule 4.355 The thrust of her article, however, re-
volves around the consequences facing a plaintiff who fails to make
timely service when using mail service. 56 Professor Mullenix con-
cludes that the federal courts are taking a liberal view towards
plaintiffs, and are permitting plaintiffs to re-serve defendants
when the initial service fails.357 She notes, however, that this re-
sults in one disadvantage, that is, defendants have already received
notice of the lawsuit when effective service finally is made because
of the initially ineffective mail service and are therefore not sur-
prised by the suit.3 58
At the end of her article, Professor Mullenix asks the question,
"[i]s federal mail service working?" 359 Although she answers this
question with a tentative yes, she calls for revision of the Rule in
order to increase the penalties which a court can impose upon a
recalcitrant defendant.360 Professor Mullenix states that, "[p]aying
costs of alternative service is a small sanction for the defendant
who successfully evades suit altogether. To date, this loophole has
proved to be the most critical in the new mail service provi-
sions."38 1 In reaching her conclusion, Professor Mullenix appears to
have overlooked C.LT. Corp. v. Manth Machine & Tool Corp.,362
where the court awarded not only the costs of personal service but
also the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiff in effecting per-
313 Mullenix, The New Federal Express: Mail Service of Process Under Amended Rule
4, 4 RE v. LITIGATION 299 (1985).
"5 Id. at 323-28.
I' Id. at 331-34.
6' Id. at 328-31; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j) (action dismissed if plaintiff failed to make
service within 120 days after filing complaint and cannot show good cause for untimely
serving).
351 Mullenix, supra note 353, at 331-38.
"' Id. at 338.
359 Id.
360 Id.
301 Id.
"2 No. 85-261C (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); see also
supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
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sonal service. 63
In addition, two cases decided subsequent to Professor Mul-
lenix's article also cast doubt on her conclusion that the lack of
sanctions is the most significant problem of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). In
these cases, a district court chose to recognize as effective received-
but-unacknowledged mail service because the defendants had will-
fully refused to return the acknowledgments. 4 Professor Mullenix
hypothesized that district courts would not recognize unacknowl-
edged service. 65
2. Acknowledgment Forms Under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
A more recent discussion of the Rule is a Note36 6 detailing the
technical hurdles to be cleared in properly effecting mail service.36, 7
After describing these hurdles, the Note suggests that the present
system of first class mail and return of an acknowledgment form
by the defendant should be replaced by a system of certified
mail.3 68 The Note further recommends that the plaintiff be re-
quired to effect personal service only in those cases in which the
certified mail remains unclaimed. If the certified mail is either
claimed or refused, then the plaintiff should be deemed to have
made service on the defendant.36 9 In defense of this proposal, the
Note compares the cost of certified mail with the cost of personal
service. The Note suggests that while certified mail will normally
cost the plaintiff $1.70, personal service will average $20 or more,7 °
and the author of the Note claims that this monetary difference is
burdensome.3 7
The Note's comparison of the cost between certified mail and
personal service is erroneous in two respects. First, it seems safe to
say that no plaintiff has ever been deterred from bringing suit be-
cause of the cost of service. Since the filing a complaint in federal
See No. 85-261C (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
' See Deshmukh v. Cook, 630 F. Supp. 956, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); System Indus., Inc.
v. Han, No. 84-5457 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The two
cases are discuised at supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
165 Mullenix, supra note 353, at 338.
6I Note, Rule 4: Service by Mail May Cost You More Than a Stamp, 61 IND. L.J. 217
(1986).
'67 Id. at 224-39.
368 Id. at 241-45.
'69 Id. at 244-45.
370 Id. at 241-42.
371 Id. at 245.
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court costs $120, and attorneys' fees can run from $50-$200 per
hour, the cost of personal service is not usually discussed when the
plaintiff and attorney consider initiation of a suit.
Second, and perhaps more important, the cost of personal ser-
vice is recoverable under Rule 4(c)(2)(D). Even the most cost-con-
scious plaintiff need not be concerned about the cost of personal
service given the willingness of courts to reimburse plaintiffs, and
the possibility that attorneys' fees can be included in such costs.372
The Note's decision to focus on the cost advantages of certified
mail misses the mark in that certified mail is simply not as reliable
as personal service. Even if the plaintiff receives a signed postal
receipt, in most instances it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove
with certainty that it is the defendant's signature which appears on
the postal card. 3  In response, the Note states that if any
problems arise as a result of the defendant not receiving the sum-
mons and complaint, they can be rectified when the defendant
moves, pursuant to Federal Rule 60, to vacate the default judg-
ment which the plaintiff has received.7 4 What this approach fails
to take into account, however, is the time, cost, and resources
which are wasted by both the parties and the courts when a de-
fault judgment is challenged. 5
VI. REWRITING THE RULE
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is
in a hopeless state of confusion. Courts and commentators alike
have attempted to answer the questions raised by this poorly-
drafted Rule. These attempts, however, are inadequate because of
conflicting interpretations of the Rule as well as the numerous
questions which have been left unanswered. As indicated by the
172 See, e.g., Fee v. Steve Snyder Enter., Inc., No. 84-2323 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), discussed supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
171 For a case in which the plaintiff received a signed postal receipt card which it
claimed bore the defendant's signature, but which the defendant claimed he had not signed,
see System Indus., Inc. v. Han, No. 84-5457 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file), discussed at supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. For a Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) case in which the handwriting on the postal receipt card was indecipherable,
see Anderson v. Champale, Inc., No. 85-0007 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file).
'7' Note, supra note 366, at 244.
175 Indeed, there are already a large number of cases in which the courts have had to
vacate default judgments entered pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) service. See, e.g., Tecnart
Industria E Comercio Ltda. v. Nova Fasteners Co., Inc., 107 F.R.D. 283 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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survey of case law and commentary set forth above, the Rule, as
currently understood and applied by the courts, may be summa-
rized as follows.
First, except for the 100-mile "bulge" provided in Rules 14
and 19, service under the Rule, regardless of the basis of jurisdic-
tion, cannot be made if the defendant is not present in the forum
state. As stated above, it is unclear whether this prohibition ex-
tends to defendants living in foreign countries.
Next, service under the Rule must be carried out in accor-
dance with all of the enclosure requirements of the Rule. Thus, the
plaintiff must mail to the defendant a copy of the summons and
complaint, two copies of a notice and acknowledgment form which
substantially comports with Form 18-A, and a prepaid, self-ad-
dressed return envelope. Minor deviations are usually acceptable.
The documents need not be sent by registered or certified mail,
although using registered mail, return receipt requested, can be
helpful, especially in those courts which do not require the plaintiff
to make follow-up personal service where the plaintiff can prove
that the defendant did receive the mailing.
Third, service under the Rule is not valid in the view of most
courts if the plaintiff does not receive the signed acknowledgment
form from the defendants within twenty days of mailing: Mere re-
ceipt of the postal card, if the mailing has been sent by return re-
ceipt requested, is not sufficient, although an acknowledgment
form signed by someone other than the defendant will be sufficient
if that person has been authorized by the defendant to accept ser-
vice. If the defendant willfully refuses to acknowledge the service,
such willfulness will probably toll the statute of limitations and
may, in some instances, cause an otherwise failed service by mail to
be deemed by the court as constituting effective service.
Additionally, if the defendant refuses or fails to acknowledge
the mail service, the plaintiff then has little choice but to effect
personal service. All other methods of service such as publication
or state methods are forfeited when the plaintiff chooses to make
his initial attempt at service pursuant to the Rule. The question of
whether the plaintiff may make more than one attempt at mail
service before being obligated to make personal service is unset-
tled. Recent cases, however, have loosened these requirements and
no longer require personal service if the plaintiff can prove that the
defendant received the mailed service.
Fifth, service, whether by mail or by follow-up personal ser-
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vice, must be completed within 120 days of the filing of the com-
plaint or the plaintiff's action will be subject to dismissal without
prejudice by the court. Moreover, if service is made by mail and
the defendant signs and returns the Form 18-A, the Form must be
filed with the court.
Finally, if the defendant refuses to acknowledge the mail ser-
vice and the plaintiff thereafter achieves personal service, the
plaintiff may recover the cost of the personal service, which may or
may not include attorneys' fees. Such costs are the only penalty
which can be visited on a recalcitrant defendant and, even then,
such costs will not be granted if the defendant proves that it did
not receive the plaintiff's mailed notice. In addition, the plaintiff
must prove the costs incurred. An affidavit detailing the plaintiff's
expenses should suffice to prove the costs.
The summary listed above is subject to numerous exceptions
and quirks, depending upon the particular federal court. Given the
current and rapidly increasing confusion regarding 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), it
is suggested that the time is long overdue for a serious evaluation
of how well the Rule is "secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action" as mandated by the Federal
Rules. 37 6 It is the opinion of the authors that the Rule is neither
just, speedy, nor inexpensive. Rather, it is nothing more than a liti-
gation breeder, chock full of unpredictable twists and turns, and
far worse than the system which it replaced. Indeed, any system
which would lead one court to describe it as "baroque 377 and an-
other court to liken it to a "trap" for the unwary 378 is clearly in
need of serious modification.
The authors believe that the answer lies in replacing Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) with the simple requirement that personal service be
made in every case. Since the Rule mandates that the plaintiff ef-
fect personal service if the attempt at mail service fails, it clearly
could not have been Congress' fear that the burden of making per-
sonal service would prevent meritorious claims from being insti-
tuted. Moreover, the cost of personal service, as judged from those
cases in which such costs have been awarded pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2)(D), is relatively small.
A proposal such as the one advocated by this Article would
371 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
37 United States v. Union Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 109 F.R.D. 153, 156 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
371 Olympus Corp. v. Dealer Sales & Serv. Inc., 107 F.R.D. 300, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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have been unthinkable in previous times when service was often
required to be made by the marshal. Now that Rule 4(c)(2)(A) al-
lows service to be made by any non-party adult,3 7 9 a system which
does.away with mail service and replaces it with personal service is
not only feasible but actually desirable. Since one purpose of ser-
vice is to notify the defendant that a lawsuit has been instituted
against him,3 s0 personal service is the method least likely to breed
the wasteful motion practice and default judgment litigation which
has already become the legacy of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress attempted to provide a speedy and inexpensive
method of service when it enacted Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). However, as
the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, the Rule is plagued by
unanswered questions and inconsistences. Courts and commenta-
tors alike have failed to resolve such vexing problems in the years
since the inception of the Rule. These problems are further exacer-
bated by potential abuses and a deteriorating postal system which
continues to grow more unreliable with each passing year.3 1' The
result is a crying need for reform.
The answer, therefore, lies in doing away with a system which
cannot possibly work and replacing it with one that has already
311 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(A). Certain exceptions remain. Under Rule 4(c)(2)(B), the
summons and complaint must be served by a United States Marshal, deputy United States
Marshal, or "by a person specifically appointed for that purpose," if the plaintiff is: 1) pro-
ceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; 2) a seaman authorized to proceed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1916; 3) the United States Government or an officer or agency of the
United States; or 4) directed by a court to have service made by a Marshal. FED. R. Civ. P.
4(c)(2)(B).
"' See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(b). At least one court has looked past the procedural quagmire
of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and stated that the only relevant inquiry regarding service by mail is
whether the defendant received notice. See Gilliam v. Quinlan, 608 F. Supp. 823, 829 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
381 It is generally acknowledged that the United States Postal Service has deteriorated
since it became a quasi-independent government agency. See, e.g., Blumenthal, Officials
Call Postal Delays Worst Since 1980, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 3. This deteriora-
tion has led to the formation of numerous private carrier services, such as Federal Express,
United Parcel Service, DHL, and Emery, which have become very popular with business
users, especially attorneys. See Hollander, Attorney and Overnight Courier Services, 72
A.B.A. J. 62 (May 1, 1986). Although the Postal Service has attempted to meet such private
sector challenges through a combination of improved services and litigation aimed at having
such private competition declared illegal, both initiatives have generally failed. See Sterne,
Postal Monopoly Obsolete, 3 J. CoM. 1A, col. 3 (May 19, 1986).
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proven its utility: personal service.382 Attempts to keep the present
system and modify it will only result in more confusion, more
abuse, more litigation, more costs, and ultimately, less justice.
382 If there is a real need to have the defendant rather than the plaintiff bear the cost of
personal service, Congress, or the courts, can simply adopt a rule which would allow a suc-
cessful plaintiff to recover, as part of the costs permitted under Rule 54(d), the cost of
making personal service. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).

